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The Soviet Athlete in International Competition

by Richard B. Walsh¹

Since the war, and particularly during the past 3 years, the efforts of the Kremlin to discredit us and our friends have reached staggering proportions. To meet and beat down these lies the U. S. Government, assisted by private groups, has greatly stepped up its truth-telling programs. In the main, our efforts are meeting with success. Through press, radio, motion pictures, overseas information centers, and the exchange of persons, we are telling the truth on an unprecedented scale. We have done well as far as we have gone.

However, something new has been added. Reports from our embassies during recent months afford positive proof that the Kremlin has mounted a gigantic cultural offensive. It is designed to prove the Soviet line of supremacy in the arts as well as on the athletic field. During 1951 they have sent a greatly increased number of artists, musicians, and athletes into competitions of one sort or another. In some cases, they have crept out cautiously from behind the Iron Curtain when conditions suited their purposes to perform with their neighbors of the free world. Of course, as you would expect, their entrants were carefully selected, and so were the events themselves, for the Soviets must win at all costs.

The role of sports in this new Soviet offensive is becoming especially significant. The Soviets have usually not competed outside their orbit. It now appears, however, that they may be preparing to display their self-acclaimed supremacy in the field of sports beyond the borders of their domination. We understand, for instance, that for the first time they may enter the 1952 Olympics in force.

In order to understand what is happening and what may take place in the coming months, we

should examine their basic concept of sports and sportsmanship.

This concept is quite neatly summed up in a resolution passed by the third plenum of the Polish Central Physical Culture Committee. It states in part:

The superiority of Stalinist "Socialist" athletics over "capitalist" athletics must be continually demonstrated.

In other words, sports in the slave world are conceived primarily as a tool of propaganda, an instrument of national policy, a means of strengthening the party line of Soviet superiority and of further indoctrinating Communists. In attempting to prove that superior athletes are the product of a superior political system, therefore, they must look superior on the field of competition. Now this has been accomplished in several devious ways. Let me give you a few examples of how they play the game.

Examples of Soviet Sportsmanship

The United Press reported on January 21 of this year that the official Chinese Communist news agency complained bitterly of the first meeting between Soviet and Chinese basketball teams. The news agency reported that the Soviets rewrote the basketball rules, changed the equipment, brought and used their own referees, and proceeded to pummel the Chinese in every game.

The Chinese complained that the Soviet basketball felt as heavy as a bowling ball and that the new Soviet international rules were all new to them. Moreover, they intimated, the referees made some mighty fishy decisions. The Chinese Communist news report said:

Whenever the spectators hissed decisions of the Soviet referees, Soviet officials said over a loud-speaker: "Now criticize your own behavior and follow the dictates of international courtesy."

But although the Chinese were not permitted to win over the Soviets, they can look forward to vic-

¹ Address made before the Amateur Athletic Union at Daytona Beach, Fla., on Dec. 1 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. Walsh is a member of the Private Enterprise Cooperation staff, Office of the General Manager of the International Information and Education Exchange Program.

tories over such countries as little Albania. In the Vodka circuit, China carries higher rank than their smaller, less powerful neighbors.

In matches with the satellites, the element of competition is somewhat affected by the fact that everyone understands what the Soviet official attitude is in sports. As in all other walks of life, the idea of superiority is intrinsically tied up with the concept of invincibility. Consequently, it is not "diplomatic" for satellite teams to defeat Soviet competitors.

For instance, at a football match in Czechoslovakia, which was won by the Soviets as usual, the resentment of the audience to the biased decisions of the referee in favor of the visiting Soviet team reached such a pitch that the Communists found it necessary to denounce the "uncultured attitude" of Czech fans publicly and warn against future repetition of the incident.

In Hungary in January, Soviet sportsmen ranked first in wrestling, boxing, weight-lifting, gymnastics, volleyball, and basketball. However, during one of the boxing matches two-thirds of the spectators got up and left after the Hungarian champion had knocked down the Soviet boxer. The referee in the ring counted so slowly that the Soviet boxer had time to rest and continue the match. In reviewing the basketball results, when the public was equally clamorous against the decisions of the referees, the general secretary of the basketball federation was quoted as stating: "It is very difficult to appoint referees when Soviet teams are playing as they must not be defeated."

Using a "fixed" referee, however, is not the only approach to the problem of winning. A newer and smoother way is the "team indoctrination plan"—making sure that your opponent is politically right! For example, the Czechoslovak Communist daily *Rude Pravo* reports that in recent months Czech soccer teams have been strengthened before each game by a 30-minute political discussion. In addition, to make them doubly strong, the teams have another political discussion after each game. This, says *Rude Pravo*, will give Czech players a chance to practice a "true Marxist spirit of criticism and self-criticism."

The importance of such discussions is easily understandable. After all, it is important to avoid the political errors that cropped up at the recent Communist World Youth Festival in East Berlin. There, a Soviet soccer team beat an East German all-star eleven by a score of 2 to 0. That, of course, was as it should be. But it seems that the German soccer fans booed Moscow's Dynamo team and the referee the Soviets had brought along. Apparently the German fans believed their team should have won—and would have if the referee had called half the fouls committed by the Dynamo. A good political discussion before the game would have taught the East German soccer player to play poorly enough so that the Soviet team would have had no trouble in winning, without the

aid of the referee. This would have cemented good relations with the Soviet Union and made it unnecessary for the Communist *Neue Deutschland* to scold German soccer fans for not being "worthy of the great confidence of the youth of the world and, above all, of the friendship of the great Soviet people."

Juggling the records is another favorite tactic employed by the Soviets to demonstrate their superiority.

For example, the Communist newspaper *Moldo-doi Bolshevik* claimed, "In six basic sports our country holds almost 30 percent of the registered world records—58 out of 205. In these same sports, the fact that the United States holds only 32, Sweden 19, France 18, Holland 12, Finland 11, Norway 9, and Denmark 9 demonstrates the superiority of Soviet sport!"

What the publication did not mention is that the Soviets concentrate in international competitions in only a few minor sports, holding their major records in weight-lifting, and pistol and rifle shooting. By taking the International Amateur Athletic Federation world records as listed in Whitaker's Almanack for 1950, the U.S.S.R. runs a mighty slow race. Of the 111 world records listed, the United States has 30, Sweden 25, Finland 11, and the U.S.S.R. only 6.

Victory by Decree

When all else fails, Soviet teams gain victory over their satellite opponents by decree. It seems that the Ashkhabad soccer team was on the point of losing to a lesser team in the Central Asia League when their nimble goalie saved the day by some adroit work. The stadium exulted and applauded the goalie's fine play. That is, all but Comrade Bekbayev, director of the Kazakhstan Physical Culture Institute, who had other ideas as to athletic victories. Racing along the soccer field he confronted the excited goalie and informed him:

"You must let the ball through twice."

"Through where?" asked the confused player.

"Through your *own* goal posts."

"Are you joking?" the goalie asked.

Bekbayev never batted an eyelash as he said tersely, "Bekbayev never jokes. Bekbayev orders!" So goes Soviet supremacy in sports.

The British have learned a bit about competing with the "win-happy" Soviets. In an amusing account, "How To Win Championships," the English newsman, Dennis Bardens, relates how the British won a so-called world-championship bobsledding match from the Soviets, but were almost talked out of it.

After surprising the Soviets by accepting an invitation to bobsled in the ninth World University Winter Games, at Poiana Stalin in Rumania, the British ran into some tough competition and none of it was from their bobsledding competitors. Be-

cause the sledding course was in poor condition, the British suggested that the contest be just a friendly one without championship status. The organizers insisted, however, that the contest be official, and this was repeated and insisted upon before the British team reached the top of the course. The British acceded and proceeded to beat all entries by 5 seconds. When the result was announced, the Rumanians looked glum, but retaliated by disallowing the victory because a British substitute racer had failed to fill in an entry form properly.

The race was rerun, and again the British won by a margin of 9.2 seconds.

"Then," says Bardens, "to the amazement of everyone, including the Czech, Italian, and Finnish teams, the organizers declared that the race was 'unofficial' and only a 'friendly contest'."

The Communists prolonged the argument for over 2 hours. The Czechs, Italians, and Finns supported the British claim. Finally, when the stadium was empty, the Communists grudgingly gave in. The British received their trophy in the privacy of their hotel room.

Back home the captain of the British bobsledding team said:

We had more fun out of it, I suspect, than the Russians. There was such a driving desperation behind their efforts to win that I felt sorry for them. Perhaps if they failed to win, it might be too bad for them.

Bardens concluded, perhaps it was as well that the British team missed the closing speech of I. Grohman, Communist president of the International Union of Students, for this is what he said:

Both the games and the way they were held, strongly contribute to the world unity of student sportsmen, promoting friendship and cooperation between the students and peoples of all countries.

So goes their story of success—but it's *their* story and the success takes place on their playing field. They are not slow to tell the world about it, however.

Listen to these choice bits from the U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin dated July 1951:

Basketball and volleyball players of the Soviet Union have never been defeated in international meets. The U.S.S.R. men and women's basketball teams are the holders of the European championships. In 1949, the men's volleyball team of the Soviet Union won the world title in the competition held in Prague, while in 1950 it came out on top in contests held for the European championship in Sofia, Bulgaria. The women's volleyball team of the U.S.S.R. also holds the European championship.

Soviet boxers are famed for their strength, speed, gamen and wonderful technique. Last Autumn they participated in 46 matches in Finland and emerged victorious in all of them.

Notwithstanding the fact that Soviet sportsmen have been playing ice hockey with a puck for only the past five years, the caliber of their performance is very high. This was proved in the match this year with the Czechoslovakian hockey players, who are among the world's best. The U.S.S.R. won the two matches by a *general* score of 12 to 3.

The superb technique and strength of the Soviet wrestlers is known far beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R.

Soviet wrestlers have scored notable victories in international meets on a number of occasions. At the close of 1949, they defeated Czechoslovakian wrestlers 15 to 1, and in Finland they were victorious by a 14 to 2 count. Making a tour in Finland in 1950 Soviet wrestlers defeated their Finnish opponents 45 to 2. In 1951, they scored a 46 to 2 victory over Hungarian and Czechoslovakian wrestlers.

Performance in the Vodka Circuit

Now we have taken a look at the record of Soviet performances in the Vodka circuit and we have listened to their boasts of superiority outside the Curtain. We are told—again from the *Soviet Information Bulletin*—that "foreign ties of the Soviet athletes are widening and gaining strength with each ensuing year." We are glad to learn this, for to date we have found very little to bear out this statement. What we have found by way of record is pretty sad indeed. Let me cite three brief examples of Soviet prowess in the free world.

At Paris, the Soviets trailed in the 1950 international weight-lifting championships—an event in which they claim to excel. The United States placed first over the defending champion Egyptian team and a strong Soviet team.

The Associated Press reported that John Davis, colored ex-GI, beat the Soviet contestant, Yakov Koutsenko, in one of the greatest exhibitions of strength ever seen in Europe when he hoisted 1,017 pounds in three lifts. Koutsenko lifted only 919 pounds. Aware that he was outclassed, the Soviet sportsman refused to try his allotted three lifts *and quit!*

Again, the recent international weight-lifting championships in Milan, Italy, demonstrated how important it is to the Soviets to have a sure winner. Although the Soviets entered a team of weight-lifters, and even sent them to Milan, they merely watched the other teams work out in the gym and decided not to offer opposition.

Incidentally, this contrasts sharply with the trip, last spring, of the Penn State soccer team to Iran. The players and coach of the team knew that they had little chance against the superior skill of the Iranians, yet they went there—and I might add, with the full cooperation of the A.A.U.—with typical American determination to play as well as they knew how regardless of the result.

The American soccer team played three games. They won one and lost two. But more than that, they won the admiration of the Iranians for their good sportsmanship and conduct on the field.

In the spring of 1950 the Soviets did a lot of talking at the World Championship Ski Races at Aspen, Colo., but no skiing.

Victor Andreyev, Russian member of the Federation Internationale de Ski and chairman of the All Union Department of Ski Sport of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, commented:

"We are representing thousands of Russian skiers by being here for this competition. . . .

It is characteristic of Russian skiers that their representatives should be the first from Russia to visit the United States."

Asked why no Soviet team was represented, Andreyev said, "Maybe we'll compete next year."

Now I want to make one thing clear. We do not deny the prowess of the Soviet athlete. We are not boasting of American supremacy. We do not have to, but we do not have to swallow the lie that the Soviet athlete is superior because he is a product of the Soviet regime.

We wish the Soviet athlete were free to compete, as our athletes are. We would like to meet them—win or lose. We would like to meet them in a spirit of fair play. We sincerely hope that this will be possible in the forthcoming Olympic games.

Sportsmanship is deeply rooted in our country's heritage. The Amateur Athletic Union has done much to advance this concept both here and abroad. It has contributed greatly to better understanding throughout the world by helping to arrange contests for American athletes and teams. The British Empire-U.S.A. track and field meet, which will follow next summer's Olympics, is one example of international sports contests in the free world. The recent Pan American games in Argentina, the European visits of track teams, and the selection of top-flight coaches to teach sports as Americans play them, all have served to acquaint the world's athletes and spectators with our high caliber of sportsmanship on the field of play.

Next year, thanks to the fine work of the A.A.U., thousands of fans in European countries will be able to see the American Olympic teams in action before and after the big games.

I believe that a great mission belongs to the A.A.U. You have in your hands the finest tools for building the kind of understanding that one day will bring genuine peace. For if we are to build a better world, it will be founded on fair play—the credo of the true sportsman. Our athletes are our finest ambassadors. We do not demand that they win; we ask only that they fight a good fight and may the best man win. We can expect nothing finer than American sportsmanship, for sportsmanship is democracy at work.

Soviet Distortion of Mutual Security Act

*Statement by Mike J. Mansfield
and John M. Vorys¹*

The Soviet delegation has proposed an item for the agenda of the General Assembly in which it charges that provisions of the Mutual Security

¹ Made on behalf of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly and released to the press on Nov. 27. Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Vorys are members of the U.S. delegation.

Act of 1951 constitute "aggressive acts" by the United States.

We are members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which considered the Mutual Security Act of 1951. We sat on the joint Senate-House Conference Committee which reconciled the differences between the House and Senate versions of that act. Our statement today is based on our intimate knowledge of that act.

The Soviet charges are based upon a distortion and misrepresentation of the provisions of the law.

There are in this law no aggressive acts or aggressive threats contemplated against the Soviet Union or against any of the countries it dominates. Nothing in this law justifies Mr. Vyshinsky's charge of "direct interference" in Soviet affairs. In making this charge he is merely up to his old tricks with which the world is becoming tiresomely familiar.

We could, of course, conclude that Mr. Vyshinsky's charges are based on his own environmental conditioning, on his own familiarity with "subversive and diversionary activities."

The Congress knew of the tragic flight of thousands of peace-loving people from behind the Iron Curtain and knew that tens of thousands more also yearned to flee from police-state persecution. Congress intended that those who stand for liberty and freedom should have the honor and the opportunity to help defend this liberty and freedom against aggression, whatever their nationality or their residence.

Section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act stands for this principle. The Soviet Union has seen fit to misinterpret this section and to call it an attempt to subvert government in the U.S.S.R.

The fact is that the purpose of this provision was to enable those persons who have fled from the tyranny and oppression of the governments behind the Iron Curtain to join their efforts with the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which stand as a bulwark against the extension of tyranny. The purpose referred to in the act is clearly set forth as support for the freedom of Europe through assistance which will further the carrying out of the plans for defense of the North Atlantic area. This is the purpose which motivated the Congress in acting and this is what the United States will do under this provision.

A reading of that portion of the act to which he refers shows its provisions are limited "to the defense of the North Atlantic area."

It has been made clear many times that the forces under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are for the purpose of defense only and that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been set up in conformity with both the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations. The Congress, in passing the Mutual Security Act of 1951, was acting to support this purpose.

In this very Assembly, the United States has

explained why it has been compelled to join in the huge task of rearming the free world—a task of which the Mutual Security Act is a part. We have also made clear our earnest desire to proceed along a wholly different path, if only the Soviet Union would join with the free world in working out a fair and effective system of disarmament. The tripartite disarmament proposals now before the United Nations represent the policies we prefer to follow. They represent the policy we could follow if only the Soviet Union would really join us in working for peace.

Italy Requests Revision Of Peace Treaty

Following is the text of a note handed on December 8 to Acting Secretary Webb by Alberto Tarchiani, Ambassador of Italy, and released to the press by the Italian Embassy on the same date:

SIR: I have the honour to refer to declarations repeatedly made by the Italian Government and to the declaration of September 26 made by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,¹ as well as to statements made by officials of other governments regarding the anomaly created by the existence of the Italian Peace Treaty and the position which Italy occupies today.

Italy's status as an active and equal member of the democratic and freedom-loving family of nations has been universally recognized. The spirit of the Peace Treaty, therefore, no longer accords with the situation prevailing today.

It was contemplated by the Peace Treaty that Italy would be admitted to membership in the United Nations. The basic assumption was that universal adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter would assure the security of all the democratic family of nations and therefore would also assure Italy's status as an equal member of that family.

The above assumption on the basis of which the Italian Peace Treaty was signed and was ratified, has not been fulfilled. Even though the preamble of the Treaty contemplated that Italy would become a full member of the United Nations, Italy's admission, although receiving on three occasions the support of the majority of member States voting in the General Assembly, has been prevented by unjustified vetoes in the Security Council on the four occasions when it was considered.

Since Italy is not a member of the United Nations, she can neither contribute fully to the peaceful development of international relations on a basis of equality with other Nations, nor take any action within the United Nations, with a view

to obtaining the revision of the clauses of the Treaty as provided for by the Treaty itself.

Meanwhile, Italy has re-established democratic institutions, participates in concert with other Nations in a number of international organizations working to establish peaceful and improved conditions of life for the peoples of the world, administers a trust territory in the name and on behalf of the United Nations, and supports the efforts of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.

In these circumstances, it has been already stated, the spirit and certain restrictive provisions of the Peace Treaty no longer appear to be appropriate.

Upon instructions of my Government, I have, therefore, the honour to propose that the Government of the United States and other signatories of the Treaty, to whom similar notes have been addressed, should agree that the spirit reflected by the Preamble no longer exists, and has been replaced by the spirit of the United Nations Charter; that the political clauses, Articles 15-18 are superfluous and that the military clauses, Articles 46-70 and the relevant Annexes, which restrict Italy's right and capacity to provide for her own defense, are not consistent with Italy's position as an equal member of the democratic and freedom-loving family of nations.

Accept, Sir, the expression of my highest consideration.

ALBERTO TARCHIANI
Ambassador of Italy

Monte Cassino Altarpiece Returned to Italy

[Released to the press December 14]

A great altarpiece of the Assumption of the Virgin lost from the Benedictine Monastery of Monte Cassino during the war has been recovered by the American officers of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany and returned to the Italian Government for restoration to the Abbot of Monte Cassino.

Photographs of the famous painting have just been received by the Department of State which show the unfortunate damage the altarpiece has suffered through its vicissitudes, but the original beauty of the composition is also apparent. It is approximately nine feet high and five feet wide and was painted by the Neapolitan artist and celebrated scholar, Paolo de Matteis (1662-1728), who worked at Monte Cassino during the years 1692 and 1706-1709. It was originally placed over the altar of the Fifth Chapel of the Basilica of Monte Cassino, which was known as the Chapel of the Assumption.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 570.

During the war a German soldier who was also a painter is reported to have found the badly damaged canvas among the rubble of the Abbey. He rolled it up and took it with him to save it from further destruction. During the war years he first stored it in Austria and about 4 years ago removed it to his home in Bavaria. He eventually wrote to the Abbot offering to return the painting and proposing that he first be commissioned to repair it.

The Italian Government informed the director of the Munich Central Collecting Point, Prof. S. Lane Faison, Jr., on leave from Williams College, of the letter with a request that the painting if found be returned to Italy. With the cooperation of the American Resident Officer at Traunstein, John Taylor Lawrence, the former German soldier was located and the painting was brought to the collecting point. Restorers of the Bavarian State Picture Gallery discovered the signature of Paolo de Matteis and it was identified as the lost altarpiece of the Assumption Chapel. Carefully packed but in no way repaired, the painting was formally delivered by the American authorities to the representative of the Italian Government, Baron Malfatti, Italian Consul at Munich, for return to Monte Cassino.

Following is the report of Professor Faison:

During the bombardment of the abbey of Monte Cassino, a German soldier named Agricola, whose peacetime profession was (and is) painting, noticed a badly damaged canvas among the rubble. As it represented *The Assumption of the Virgin* and seemed to be an altarpiece of some value, he rolled it up and took it with him to save it from further destruction. During the remaining war years he stored it in Austria, and about four years ago, moved it to his home on the Chiemsee, Bavaria. In due course, he wrote to the Abbot of Monte Cassino, offering to return the painting, but hoping to get the business of repairing the picture before sending it back.

The Abbot turned over the letter to the Office for the Recovery of Works of Art, in Rome. Here it was eventually forwarded to the Italian consul in Munich, Baron Malfatti, with a request that the painting be returned to Italy.

Baron Malfatti handed me this letter and accompanying request in July 1951 at the Central Collecting Point. Through the cooperation of the Resident Officer at Traunstein, Mr. Lawrence, the artist was located and the painting delivered to my office in Munich on August 1st. Agricola himself came in the next day, corroborated the story and asked my help in getting him the commission to repair the picture.

When the canvas was unrolled, it turned out to be no less than 267 cm. high by 150 cm. wide (9' x 5').

Restorers of the Bayrische Staatsgemaldegammlungen quickly uncovered the signature of Paolo de Matteis (1622-1728), a Neapolitan painter. Identification of the picture as the altarpiece of the Fifth Chapel called the Assumption Chapel to the Basilica was easily made from prewar guide books to Monte Cassino.

Photographs were immediately taken of the condition of the painting. One of these was given Baron Malfatti, who came to inspect it soon after its arrival. On August 9, the painting, carefully packed by the Bayrische Staatsgemaldegammlungen, but in no way repaired, was formally returned to Baron Malfatti, who tendered a signed receipt. The receipt, together with a photograph of the painting, is now kept in the office of Dr. Breitenbach, Office of Public Affairs, Hroog Headquarters Building, Frankfurt.

Italy Granted Copyright Extension

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the President is authorized, in accordance with the conditions prescribed in section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, which includes the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended by the act of September 25, 1941, 55 Stat. 732, to grant an extension of time for fulfillment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the copyright laws of the United States of America, with respect to works first produced or published outside the United States of America and subject to copyright or to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America, by nationals of countries which accord substantially equal treatment to citizens of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS the President of Italy has issued a decree, effective from this day, by the terms of which treatment substantially equal to that authorized by the aforesaid section 9 of title 17 is accorded in Italy to literary and artistic works first produced or published in the United States of America during the period commencing on September 3, 1939, and ending one year after the date of this decree; and

WHEREAS the aforesaid decree is annexed to and is part of an agreement embodied in notes exchanged this day between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Italy; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America dated April 9, 1910 (36 Stat. 2685), citizens of Italy are, and since July 1, 1909, have been, entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909, other than the benefits of section 1 (e) of that act; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated May 1, 1915 (39 Stat. 1725), the citizens of Italy are, and since May 1, 1915, have been, entitled to the benefits of section 1 (e) of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid title 17, do declare and proclaim:

That with respect to (1) works of citizens of Italy which were first produced or published outside the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, and subject to copyright under the laws of the United States of America, and (2) works of citizens of Italy subject to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, there has existed during several years of the time since September 3, 1939, such disruption or suspension of facilities essential to compliance with the conditions and formalities prescribed with respect to such works by the copyright laws of the United States of America as to bring such works within the terms of the aforesaid title 17, and that, accordingly, the time within which compliance with such conditions and formalities may take place is hereby extended with respect to such works for one year after the date of this proclamation.


It shall be understood that the term of copyright in any case is not and cannot be altered or affected by this proclamation, and that, as provided by the aforesaid title 17, no liability shall attach under the said title for lawful uses made or acts done prior to the effective date of this proclamation in connection with above-described works, or in respect to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business undertaking or enterprise lawfully entered into prior to such date involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, circulation, or performance of any such work.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

¹ 16 Fed. Reg., p. 12635.

DONE at the City of Washington this twelfth day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.

[SEAL]



By the President:
JAMES E. WEBB,
Acting Secretary of State

France Ratifies Schuman Plan Treaty

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press December 14]

The action taken by the French Assembly in voting favorably on the ratification of the Schuman Plan Treaty is a major step in the direction of building a strong and unified Western Europe. It is my hope that other Parliaments will quickly follow the lead given first by the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States General on October 31 and now by the French Assembly, and that this treaty, which has become for all of us a milestone of the first importance, will soon enter into force.

The endorsement by such a large favorable vote of the bold plan proposed by Mr. Schuman would appear to reflect a widespread feeling among the French people that the course of close cooperation with her neighbors is the course of wisdom and augurs well for future developments.

Deadline for American Claimants Of German Enemy Property

[Released to the press December 12]

Notice is hereby given that under article 23 of the Brussels agreement relating to the resolution of conflicting claims to German enemy assets (the Brussels intercustodial agreement) claims of Americans who have certain interests in property in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands seized or blocked as German enemy property must be sponsored by the State Department and received by the country in which the property is located by January 24, 1952.

The type of claim falling under article 23, in general, involves property of any kind in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands owned by a corporation or other enterprise organized under the laws of Germany, in which corporation or enterprise Americans are shareholders, bondholders, or have any other form of participation.

Americans with this type of claim are requested to submit *forthwith* information thereon to the Department of State, so that the Department may examine the claim and, if appropriate, transmit it to the country concerned as a sponsored claim under the Brussels intercustodial agreement. Communications to the Department should be addressed to Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.; should refer to the present press release; and should contain information as to the kind of property, the country in which it is located, the interest of the American claimant in the property, the estimated value of such interest, the residence and nationality status of the claimant, and any facts which would be helpful in tracing the American interest into the property in question. Communications should also refer to any prior correspondence with the Department of State.

In the present connection reference is made to earlier press releases of February 6, 1951, no. 92, "Entry into force of Brussels agreement relating to the resolution of conflicting claims to German enemy assets," and no. 93, "American interests in property in Allied or neutral countries seized or blocked as 'enemy' property."¹ Claimants who have filed under press release no. 93 need not file under the present press release. It should be pointed out that press release no. 93 is broader than the present press release and requests information as to property in all Allied or neutral countries which has been seized or blocked as German, Japanese, Italian, Bulgarian, or Hungarian and whether the American interest is direct or indirect. While the deadline of January 24, 1952, applies only to the claims described in the second paragraph, the Department of State urges again the submission of information on the other claims as early as possible, in view of the Department's intention to bring this program to a close.

Finnish Choral Recording Presented to the President

[Released to the press December 4]

On December 4, John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol, accepted on behalf of President Harry S. Truman, musical greetings recorded by a chorus of Finnish railroad men from Jyväskylä, a small town in the central part of Finland. The presentation was made by Mrs. Andrew Winton Roth of Harrison, N. Y.

The Finnish chorus were guests of the Norwegian railroad men at a choral competition held in Narvik, Norway, last June. Following a chance meeting between Mrs. Roth and the members of the Finnish chorus in the Viking Ship Museum in

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, pp. 293 and 294.

Oslo, the group of thirty men burst into song to greet "an American." Mrs. Roth's enthusiastic applause inspired the Finnish chorus to want to sing especially for Americans. The chorus then recorded two songs—"Finlandia" by Sibelius and "Kissan Kellot" for Mrs. Roth to take back with her to the United States to be delivered to President Truman as a greeting from one democracy to another.

A similar presentation was made earlier today by Mrs. Roth to the American railroad workers. The recording was accepted by President George M. Harrison, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks on behalf of the Railway Labor Executive Association.

Detention of Americans In Communist China

[Released to the press December 12]

The following is the substance of an oral announcement to the press made by the Department of State on December 8:

The Department has for some time been concerned about detention of Americans by officials of the Chinese Communist regime.¹ Meanwhile information on the general situation in which Americans in Communist China find themselves has been made available to any who inquire.

The Department, however, has refrained from making individual names public. It has advised the relatives or associates of persons detained that publicity in individual cases was a matter for their decision and it has not discouraged those who wished to give publicity to the arrests.

The Department has refrained from publicizing the names and specific situations of those persons or all of the action the Department has taken in their behalf for two major reasons: (1) requests of relatives or associates of the person concerned that no publicity be given for fear of jeopardizing the person's welfare; and (2) warnings by countries assisting in making representations to the Chinese Communists that in their opinion official publicity, particularly during the period of their activity on our behalf, might jeopardize the success of their efforts.

Americans are not the only ones under detention in Communist China. There are numerous other foreigners also under arrest, including nationals of countries which have recognized the Chinese Communists and which have established diplomatic relations in Peiping. All foreigners face these same difficulties.

In this connection it will be recalled that the Department issued a series of warnings to Amer-

ican citizens in China to evacuate that country before the Communists took over unless they were prepared to remain under hazardous conditions. The American Embassy in China on July 26, 1949, publicly warned all Americans in China that the Chinese Communists "had demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to afford adequate protection to foreigners or to safeguard their individual liberties, particularly in connection with arrest, detention, trial and mob action."

Many Americans left in the face of these warnings, and where no adequate means of transportation were available this Government assisted them in departing by providing military air and sea transport.

There are still about 300 Americans in Communist China. Most are engaged in business or missionary activities, and are not in prison, although some 30 had been reported to be under house arrest. Seven of these are now reported to have been released. However, as in some instances final confirmation has not yet been received, the Department cannot make their names public. The situation is complicated by the difficulty in obtaining accurate and up-to-date information in many cases.

Two of the 32 persons formerly listed as in prison have now been released and have left China. In addition, Philip Cline, who had been under arrest, was released from prison, but died in a Chinese hospital. The Department has also received further information reporting that one person formerly believed to be under house arrest is now in prison and that two additional Americans were arrested in August and September, leaving this total at 32.

The Department continues to make every effort to free those held in prison or detained against their will. The Department, however, does not consider it advisable at this time to make public all the details regarding the steps it is taking and has taken to accomplish the release of detained Americans.

Tax Conventions With Norway Enter into Force

[Released to the press December 11]

James E. Webb, Acting Secretary, and His Excellency Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstjerne, Norwegian Ambassador at Washington, on December 11 exchanged the instruments of ratification of the two tax conventions between the United States and Norway which were signed at Washington on June 13, 1949. The two conventions thereupon entered into force in accordance with their respective terms.

The Senate, on September 17, 1951, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of both of the conventions. Senate approval of the convention

¹ See BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 947.

relating to income taxes was made subject to an understanding reading as follows:

It is understood that the application of Article XVII of the convention shall be confined and limited as granting authority to each Contracting State to collect only such taxes imposed by the other Contracting State as will insure that the exemption or reduced rate of tax granted under the present convention by such other State, shall not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits.

Senate approval of the convention relating to taxes on estates and inheritances was made subject to a reservation reading as follows:

The Government of the United States of America does not accept Article IX of the convention, relating to reciprocal assistance in the collection of taxes.

The understanding and reservation above-quoted were accepted by Norway, and on November 26, 1951, the President ratified both of the conventions. A proclamation with respect to the entry into force of each of the two conventions will be issued by the President.

Agreement With Israel for Economic Assistance

[Released to the press December 10]

An interim agreement to make available, beginning immediately, up to \$25,730,000 for economic assistance to Israel has been concluded between the Governments of Israel and the United States, the Department of State announced on December 10.

This money is being made available from funds appropriated by Congress under section 205 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This section authorizes the utilization of not to exceed \$50,000,000 in the fiscal year 1952 for specific refugee relief and resettlement projects in Israel. The program is being administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration in the Department of State.

The agreement was effected by an exchange of notes between the two Governments on December 7, 1951. The funds made available under the terms of the interim agreement are to provide for meeting certain immediate needs until a general agreement covering the entire economic assistance program can be negotiated. Under its terms, the United States will assist Israel in paying for goods which have been purchased since July 1, 1951, including wheat, oil seeds, petroleum, and raw cotton for textile manufacture. Such purchases amounted to approximately \$14,230,000 in value. The remainder of the funds made available under this agreement will be used for contracting for shipment of about \$6,000,000 worth of foodstuffs, \$3,000,000 worth of essential components of a power plant, and \$2,500,000 worth of irrigation

equipment, both of the latter items closely linked to the problem of bringing additional land under cultivation. As the exchange of notes indicates, the foregoing materials are for refugee relief and resettlement projects in Israel.

Israel is undertaking to earmark at least an equal amount of its own currency to be used for goods and services for specific refugee relief and resettlement projects and for furthering the economic development of Israel along specific lines to be subsequently agreed upon by the two Governments.

The texts of the two notes follow:

DECEMBER 7, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to current negotiations between representatives of the Government of Israel and representatives of the Government of the United States of America looking to the conclusion of an agreement for a program of economic assistance and technical cooperation and the relief and resettlement of refugees as authorized in the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement concerning this program, which is now under study, and in order to provide emergency economic assistance to Israel as authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, I am setting forth below certain principles and procedures on which our two governments have reached agreement.

1. In accordance with Section 511 (b) of the Mutual Security Act, assurance is requested that the Israel Government has agreed to join with the United States Government in promoting international understanding and good-will and in maintaining world peace and to undertake such action as they may mutually agree upon to alleviate the causes for international tension.

2. The United States understands that the Israel Government has taken careful note of the provisions of the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the laws mentioned therein under which assistance may be provided, and that it intends to conclude an agreement with the United States Government as required by those provisions.

3. Pending the conclusion of this comprehensive agreement, however, my Government understands that the Israel Government has an immediate requirement of \$25,730,000 to pay for certain materials delivered by suppliers and shipped to Israel since July 1, 1951, materials now ready for shipment and delivery, and new purchases urgently required, all of which are for refugee and relief projects in Israel. In recognition of this need the United States Government will make available beginning immediately up to \$25,730,000, out of funds authorized under Section 205 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, to pay for these materials and such services as may be mutually agreed upon. Payments out of this sum will be made under appropriate procedures to be mutually agreed upon.

4. It is understood that such immediate requirements may include up to \$14,230,000 of current unpaid dollar obligations for refugee relief and resettlement projects or for reimbursement for payments for deliveries effected since July 1, 1951 of materials comprising parts of such relief and resettlement projects.

5. As a further means of carrying out the purposes for which the assistance made available by the United States Government is being provided, the Israel Government will deposit in a special account in the name of the Israel Government not less than the Israel pound equivalent, according to the official rate of exchange, of the dollar sums which may be paid under this agreement. Such deposits will be made from time to time upon notification to the Israel Government by the United States Government that payment has been made pursuant to this understanding. The sums required to be deposited in this

special account shall be adjusted to conform with any change in the basis of computation of the amounts to be deposited that may hereafter be agreed upon. The sums in this Israel Government account shall be held or used for such purposes as may be agreed to between our two governments in furtherance of economic and technical assistance and the relief and resettlement of refugees.

6. The Israel Government and the United States Government will establish procedures whereby the Israel Government will so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance undertaken by the United States Government so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government when in the opinion of the United States Government such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the program of assistance.

If the Israel Government agrees that the foregoing represents an accurate statement of the understanding of our two Governments on this matter, I should appreciate receiving from you a written acknowledgment of this fact so that this note and your reply thereto may constitute an interim agreement between our two governments on this subject.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

JAMES E. WEBB
*Acting Secretary of State of
the United States of America.*

DECEMBER 7, 1951

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated December 7, 1951, referring to current negotiations between representatives of the Government of the United States and representatives of the Government of Israel looking to the conclusion of an agreement for a program of economic assistance and technical cooperation, and the relief and resettlement of refugees, as authorized in the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951.

I have the honor to confirm that the principles and procedures which you enumerate in your note of December 7, 1951 are those on which our two Governments have reached agreement, and that the aforementioned note contains an accurate understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

The Government of Israel wishes to assure the Government of the United States of America that it agrees to join with the Government of the United States in promoting international understanding and good-will and in maintaining world peace and to undertake such action as they mutually agree upon to alleviate the causes for international tension.

I have the honor to confirm that your note and this reply may constitute an interim agreement between our two Governments on this subject.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ABBA EBAN
[Ambassador of Israel]

Air Force Mission Agreement With Uruguay

[Released to the press December 4]

James E. Webb, Acting Secretary, and Señor José A. Mora, Ambassador of Uruguay to the United States, signed on December 4 an agreement providing for the detail of personnel of the U.S.

Air Force to serve as an advisory mission in Uruguay. The agreement is to continue in force for 4 years from the date of signature and may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Uruguay.

The agreement is similar to numerous other agreements in force between the United States and certain other American Republics providing for the detail of officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to advise the armed forces of those countries. The provisions of the agreement relate to the duties, rank, and precedence of the personnel of the mission, the travel accommodations to be provided for the members of the mission and their families, and other related matters.

Point Four Contract To Increase Water Supply in Iran

[Released to the press December 10]

To help meet the critical need for water in Iran, a well-drilling program is being undertaken under the Point Four program for technical cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Iran, it was announced on December 10 by Jonathan Bingham, Acting Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

A contract has been signed with J. L. Richards, an American contractor with 9 years of experience in well-drilling and other construction in Iran.

Water is a key to further agricultural and economic development in Iran, where rainfall averages about 10 inches a year and only 3 percent of the land area is under cultivation. Water is scarce and expensive, and further development of water supplies is beyond the means of small villagers and farmers. Those who have access to irrigation water brought in through canals and tunnels frequently have to pay exorbitant rates for water rights.

The contract with Mr. Richards provides for a start on a long-range program to provide water for villages and small farms. The results from the first wells called for in the contract will provide the basis for an expanded well-drilling program.

The wells will be drilled to an average depth of about 200 feet. They will be complete with steel casings, a concrete-based well house, diesel-powered pump, and a simple distribution system to bring clean water into the village. Plans are in preparation whereby maintenance and operating costs will be borne out of revenues from water rentals or payments. The rights to the wells, the well-site, and water rights are to be held in perpetuity by the villages through cooperative arrangements.

The Point Four program of technical cooperation and economic assistance in Iran, under which the well-drilling project is being carried out, is under the direction of William E. Warne. Mr. Warne, a former Assistant Secretary of the Interior for water and power development, has had many years of experience with problems such as that of water in Iran, including association with the Missouri River Basin plan and the Columbia River Basin project in the United States.

The water-development program in Iran will be devoted primarily to serving the needs of small landholders and villagers, both to provide clean water as a health protection measure as well as water for irrigation. The water program will be directed toward improving the health and the agricultural production of the Iranian peasant.

Safety of Life at Sea Convention To Come Into Force

[Released to the press December 4]

The Department of State announced on December 4 that, according to information received from the British Government, the necessary number of acceptances of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea of 1948 have been received and the convention will come into force on November 19, 1952. This convention provides for improved international standards for safety of life at sea in the fields of ship construction, fire protection, lifesaving appliances, radio equipment, dangerous cargoes, and navigation generally. It will supersede, as between nations which have accepted it, the present convention of the same nature which was signed at London on May 31, 1929.

The 1948 convention was agreed to at a conference of representatives of 30 nations, held in London from April 23, 1948, to June 10, 1948. The United States was represented at this conference by a delegation chosen from Government agencies and from industry and labor organizations interested in maritime safety. The head of the U.S. delegation was Admiral Joseph F. Farley, then Commandant of the Coast Guard.

The convention, following its approval by the Senate on April 20, 1949, was ratified by the President on December 16, 1949, and the instrument of ratification deposited with the British Government on January 5, 1950.

The convention provides that it will come into force one year after there have been received by the British Government, as depositary, the acceptances of 15 nations, at least 7 of which are countries with merchant marines of one million gross tons or over. Countries which have so far accepted are Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States, in the million-ton class; and Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portu-

gal, Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. It is expected that many additional countries will accept the convention in the near future, since the 1929 convention received wide acceptance.

The action in respect to the 1948 Convention for Safety of Life at Sea does not affect the revised Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which was also drawn up at London in 1948. These revised regulations make certain changes in present international practices for the equipping and handling of ships to prevent collisions and are entirely separate from the safety convention. The revised collision regulations will come into effect only after they have been accepted by substantially all of the maritime countries of the world. Thirty-two countries, including the United States, have agreed to them so far.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1949-June 30, 1950. International Organization and Conference Series I, 14. Pub. 4216. xviii, 337 pp. 70¢.

Contains brief accounts of international conferences and meetings of international organizations in which the U.S. Government participated.

Reciprocal Trade. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2237. Pub. 4217. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica extending agreement of April 4, 1950, and terminating agreement of November 28, 1936—Exchange of notes signed at Washington April 3, 1951; entered into force April 3, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2239. Pub. 4222. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Exchange of notes signed at Rio de Janeiro December 19, 1950; entered into force December 19, 1950.

The American Republics Strengthen Continental Security. International Organization and Conference Series II. American Republics 8. Pub. 4259. 12 pp. 10¢.

A foreign affairs outline.

Why Foreign Aid—Facts About the Mutual Security Program. General Foreign Policy Series 60. Pub. 4301. 17 pp. 20¢.

A pamphlet giving facts about the Mutual Security Program with tables and maps.

(Continued on page 1041)

U.N. Considers German Unification Issue

*Statement by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The purpose of the draft resolution before us is very simple. It is to help the German people lay the ground work for holding genuinely free elections. This is the basic prerequisite for the unification of Germany. This proposal gives expression to the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations. One of the purposes of the United Nations, as set forth in the second paragraph of article I of the Charter is:

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

There can be no self-determination unless there exists the opportunity for a free expression of the will of the people.

On September 27 of this year the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany adopted a series of proposals restating their desire to bring about the reunification of Germany through free elections. These proposals were adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Federal Parliament. They were supported by all major parties in the Government and in the opposition. One of the proposals called for the investigation by an impartial commission of the United Nations to determine whether conditions throughout all of Germany made it possible to hold genuinely free elections. It is this proposal which the resolution now before us is intended to carry out.

Today, 6½ years after the end of the fighting, Germany is not united.

¹ Made before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 4 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For texts of the most recent communications on the subject of German elections, together with a chronological list of principal proposals made by the West, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 694.

This condition is not good for Germany; it is not good for Europe; it is not good for peace. My Government supports this resolution because we believe that the fact-finding mission which it establishes may provide a means of resolving this deadlock which is responsible for this division. We do not ask the United Nations to relieve the Four Occupation Powers of one iota of their responsibility in Germany. We do ask the United Nations to perform a simple fact-finding function to clear the way for a renewed effort on the part of the Four Powers to resolve their differences. There could be no more appropriate use of the powers of the General Assembly.

Since the end of the war, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have been striving toward the goal of a free, democratic, and unified German nation capable of assuming the role of a peaceful and constructive member of the European community. It is not my purpose here to review in detail the development of this policy, but a brief description of the action taken by the Western and Eastern zones of Germany during the past several years is essential to a full appreciation of the significance and necessity of this draft resolution.

Every effort toward unification on the part of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and I can say the Federal Republic of Germany, has been based upon a principle from which there can be no withdrawal and about which there can be no compromise. That principle, held by free men everywhere, is that the political unity of Germany must be based upon the free expression of the German people in every part of Germany, through the instrument of free and secret elections. They have known, as free men throughout the world know, that there can

Text of Tripartite Resolution on Free German Elections

U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.11
Dated Dec. 1, 1951

WHEREAS the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, acting on a proposal made by the German Federal Chancellor, have brought before the General Assembly a request for the appointment of an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas,

The General Assembly

HAVING REGARD to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, and taking due account of the responsibilities of the Four Powers regarding Germany,

1. *Considers* it desirable to give effect to this request;

2. *Resolves* to appoint a Commission composed of the representatives of . . . which shall carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections throughout these areas. The Commission shall investigate the following matters in so far as they affect the holding of free elections;

(a) The constitutional provisions in force in these areas and their application as regards the

various aspects of individual freedom, in particular the degree to which, in practice the individual enjoys freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press and broadcasting.

(b) Freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) The organization and activities of the judiciary, police and other administrative organs.

3. *Calls upon* all authorities in the Federal Republic, Berlin, and the Soviet zone to enable the Commission to travel freely throughout the areas referred to above; and to allot the Commission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary in the course of executing its task and to allow it to summon any witnesses whom it wishes to examine.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General

(a) Upon adoption of the resolution to make the necessary arrangements with all the authorities concerned to enable the Commission to undertake its work according to the terms of the present resolution and

(b) to furnish the Commission with necessary staff and facilities.

5. *Directs* the Commission to submit its findings at the earliest practicable date to the Secretary-General for the consideration of the Four Powers and for the information of other Members of the United Nations.

be no free elections unless certain conditions of freedom exist.

We believe that the individual citizen must be able to express his will at the polls on the basis of full information and without fear of intimidation or reprisal. He must know when he votes or when he campaigns for himself or others that it will not cost him his freedom or his job. He must be able to organize political parties which are able to express their views at public meetings and through the press and radio without being subjected to official censorship or being suppressed if what they say does not please those in power. Unless such conditions of freedom actually exist, the individual cannot vote freely, even though democratic constitutions and laws may make provision for basic rights and freedoms. I should like to describe briefly what the Three Powers have done in Western Germany to establish those conditions.

The ground work was laid in 1945 and 1946 for the growth of representative government at all levels. Free and secret elections were held at state and local levels throughout West Germany in 1946 and 1947. In each state a government was established on the basis of these elections which included a representative parliament, responsible executive, and independent judiciary. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the rights

and freedoms of the individual have been observed and protected in practice under these democratic governments.

Soviet Pressure on the East German Voting Population

Repeated refusals on the part of the Soviet Union to apply in its zone these basic principles was one of the main factors which led the French, United Kingdom, and United States Governments to propose the merger of their three zones in 1948. This merger was based on a constitution which was drafted and adopted by freely elected representatives of the West German states. Under its provisions free elections were held in West Germany in August 1949, to establish the Government of the Federal Republic. A fully representative parliament, a responsible executive, and an independent judiciary were established and are functioning today. The Federal Republic represents the free will of approximately three-fourths of the population in the four Occupation zones of Germany.

In sharp contrast political development in the Soviet-occupied zone has followed the all too familiar pattern of repression. It has been marked by the suppression of freedom and by the imposition of a highly centralized regime responsive

solely to the dictates of a single state party. Freedom to organize political parties has been denied. The Socialist Party, which has the strongest democratic party in Eastern Germany, was forced to merge with the Socialist Unity Party by Soviet ultimatum. The activities of smaller parties have been brought gradually under state control by a continuous process of coercion and discrimination. Normal political and community activities have been taken over by state-controlled mass organizations in which large numbers of the population are forced to participate. Although provisions for parliamentary elections had been included in the Soviet zone constitution, they were delayed for a year and a half while this process of consolidation and control was being completed. The first parliament was not elected, but was brought into being by proclamation. When elections were finally held in October 1950, a single list of candidates was presented to the electorate on the basis of a "yes" or "no" vote. The Soviet zone constitutional provision for a secret ballot was not observed during these elections. Reports coming from the Soviet zone at that time were that the voting population was under such extreme pressure from the various organs of the Soviet zone regime that they had little chance of registering opposition.

I have not compared these developments for the purpose of prejudging the work of the commission. I have done so to make it clear to the Committee that it is the differences respecting the freedom of elections and the conditions of freedom which make elections possible which now stand in the way of German unification. I have done so to emphasize the inseparability of unity and freedom in our policy for Germany. The Western Allies do not propose to bargain away democratic freedoms in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. We believe this is also the view of the German people of these regions who have done much to establish these freedoms. We also believe this view would be expressed by the people of Eastern Germany if they were permitted to speak their minds. It is no disservice to the cause of German unity to insist that it be based on free elections and the conditions which make them possible. It is rather the creation of the foundation upon which German unity and independence must be built, if they are to endure.

At present there is difference of opinion as to the extent to which freedom exists in the various parts of Germany. The purpose of the proposed commission would be to clear up those doubts and establish the facts on which German unity could be based.

The policy of unity based on freedom has been repeatedly rejected by the Soviet authorities. The difficulties of finding agreement were increased by the Soviet walk-out from the Four Power Control Council and from the Berlin Government, and by the cruel blockade directed against the

people of Berlin in 1948. Despite repeated appeals at every stage of the unification of Western Germany, the Soviets have persisted in a policy of isolation. Eastern Germany has been sealed against political, economic, and social intercourse with the rest of Germany.

Summary of Western Efforts

I would like to summarize some of the efforts that the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have made to reach agreement with the Soviet Government upon these disputed issues. The Council of Foreign Ministers has attempted to settle this problem, and at its last meeting in May 1949, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom offered, without success, a proposal for restoring the political unity of Germany. At the recent meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, held in Paris, the Deputy Foreign Ministers were unable to agree on an agenda for a Four Power conference. But in this meeting, the deputies representing the three Western Powers again submitted the item on German unification.

On May 25, 1950, the High Commissioners of the three Western Powers transmitted separate letters to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, Soviet Commander in Chief and President of the Soviet-controlled Commission for Germany, proposing measures for the political unification of Germany. General Chuikov did not answer these letters. On October 9, 1950, the Commissioners wrote again to General Chuikov, calling attention to their letter of May 25, and to a resolution adopted by the Bundestag of Western Germany, requesting the Four Powers to arrange for the holding, in all four zones of occupation, of elections to an all-German Parliament. The Soviet authorities have not answered this letter.

The Federal Republic of Western Germany has urged as its chief policy the unification of Germany. It has made proposals which, if accepted throughout Germany, would make it possible to hold free elections for this purpose. Its views, although well-known, have received until recently scant attention from German authorities in the Soviet zone. In fact, on March 14 of this year, the spokesman of the Soviet zone, Mr. Grotewohl, stated that all possibilities of reaching an agreement with Western Germany on unification had been exhausted and that the people must take matters into their own hands.

In recent months the spokesman from the Eastern zone of Germany have indicated that they would be prepared to discuss elections for an all-German assembly. The Federal Republic has stated their view that the conditions in the Eastern zone are such that it is not possible to hold free elections at the present time. They have further stated that it would be valueless to enter a conference without evidence that there was a

serious intention on that part of the East German authorities to create those conditions which would make free elections possible. The Federal Republic also holds the view that the authorities in the Eastern zone do not represent the people in that zone and have no authority to speak for them. My Government supports the Federal Government in their views.

On the other hand, the authorities in the Eastern zone have expressed the view that conditions in the Federal Republic make impossible the holding of free elections, and have attacked the Federal Republic as being itself unrepresentative. This is a view which we reject.

Proposed Commission Presents an Opportunity To Break the Deadlock

The important thing, however, is that the Soviet zone authorities have at least stated their agreement with the reiterated view of the Federal Republic and the three Western Powers that free all-German elections should be held. The disagreements that exist concern the extent to which conditions in Germany now permit the holding of free elections. It is precisely because of this situation that my Government has joined France and the United Kingdom in proposing an impartial, international investigation.

We can serve no useful purpose by engaging in propaganda and name-calling over an issue so important to the world and so close to the hearts of all Germans. We could begin to break the deadlock if all those involved would accept the services of the United Nations commission proposed in this draft resolution. If the commission finds conditions favorable for free elections, the way will be open for a renewed Four-Power effort to hold them. If the commission finds conditions unfavorable, its report would provide an impartial basis for taking whatever corrective action is necessary.

It will be necessary that the German and Occupation authorities in these areas afford every assistance and facility to the commission. The French, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the Government of the Federal Republic and the authorities of West Berlin, have already indicated their willingness to grant entry to, and facilitate the work of, such a commission. We urge the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the German authorities of East Berlin and the Soviet zone to follow suit.

The Soviet authorities have made a great point of the necessity of granting the Germans themselves their right to determine their future. This is their chance to show that they really mean what they say. The proposed commission would lay the foundation for the creation of a free, united, and democratic Germany able to participate in the community of nations.

Tripartite Commission Concludes Meetings on German Debts

[Released to the press December 11]

*Following is the text of a communiqué issued December 10, 1951, at London for publication today by the Tripartite Commission on German Debts:*¹

The Tripartite Commission on German Debts, whose members are Sir George Rendel, F. D. Greggh, and Warren Lee Pierson, and the German delegation on external debts headed by H. Abs, announced on December 11 the conclusion of a series of meetings which have been taking place over the last 2 weeks in Lancaster House, London. These meetings were concerned primarily with the general lines of a settlement of the claims arising from the postwar economic assistance given to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. There was a marked degree of mutual understanding on the problems involved.

At the beginning of these meetings the German delegation was informed of the details of these claims, the totals of which are as follows: United Kingdom £201,000,000; France \$15,700,000; and United States, about \$3,200,000,000. During the close examination of the items composing the claims the three Governments agree that certain adjustments put forward by the German delegation should be taken into account. However, it was agreed that these figures were a fair description of the extent of the postwar economic assistance to Germany by the three Governments. In the exchange of notes of March 6, 1951, between the Allied High Commission and the German Federal Government, the priority of these claims over all other claims was recognized. The three Governments, however, have already made it clear that they would be prepared to modify this priority in order to make possible a comprehensive and equitable settlement of the German debt problem. The United Kingdom, French, and United States delegations to the Tripartite Commission have now informed the German delegation that their Governments are prepared to make important concessions, both with respect to priority and the total amounts of their claims in respect of postwar assistance, on the clear understanding that these concessions are conditional on the achievement of a satisfactory and equitable settlement of Germany's prewar debts.

As regards the United Kingdom claim, His Majesty's Government is prepared to accept in settlement of their claim £150,000,000, to waive all interest on this amount and to accept repayment over 20 years in equal annuities of £7,500,000.

¹ For previous information regarding this series of meetings see BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 901; *ibid.*, June 25, 1951, p. 1023; *ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 35; and *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p. 61.

As regards the French claim, the French Government is prepared to accept in settlement of their claim \$11,840,000, to waive all interest on this amount and to accept repayment in French francs over 20 years in equal annuities at the rate of \$592,000.

As regards the United States claim, the U.S. Government is prepared to accept in settlement of its claim approximately \$1,200,000,000. This sum will bear interest at 2½ percent per annum and will be payable in 35 annual installments of about \$52,000,000 each. These proposals include the amounts due under certain existing surplus property agreements. The magnitude of these concessions is such as to make it unnecessary to consider any detailed adjustment of the figures of the total claims.

The Tripartite Commission informed the German delegation that the three Governments understand that neither the Federal Government nor its nationals will present any counterclaims against them in connection with or incidental to their activities in Germany since the end of hostilities.

The Tripartite Commission made it clear to the German delegation that the concessions which the three Governments are prepared to make have been arrived at after the most careful and thorough consideration, and that in their view, as a result, there is an adequate economic and financial basis for the achievement of a reasonable settlement of Germany's prewar debts, which will be fair and equitable for all concerned.

Herr Abs expressed his personal appreciation of the concessions which the three Governments were now prepared to make, and said that he was sure that the Federal Government and the German public would appreciate the great extent to which they were likely to contribute to the achievement of a comprehensive and satisfactory settlement of the German debt problem.

At the conclusion of the meetings it was recognized that a situation had now been created which was favorable to the successful outcome of an international debt conference, and it was agreed that this could now open early in the new year.

Italy's Application for U.N. Membership

*Statement by John M. Vorys
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The United States has always supported the right of Italy to membership in this organization, by its voice and by its votes, in the Assembly and in the Security Council. The application of Italy has been before the Security Council four times. The U.S. representative has four times raised his

¹ Released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on Dec. 7.

hand in support of that application. As we all know, the Soviet Union has four times vetoed the Italian application.

According to the constitutional plan of the Charter, every applicant for membership has the right to have its own application weighed in the balance. Article 4 of the Charter entitles each applicant to the judgment of the organization. The tests are well understood. Each applicant must be a peace-loving state, and "in the judgment of the organization," able and willing to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. There is no doubt about the views of the large majority of the members of this organization on Italy's qualifications. Fifty-one members of the General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution 2 years ago stating that Italy is qualified for admission. But Italy now has unique qualifications based upon a trusteeship responsibility given to the U.N. under the Italian treaty by the U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S.S.R. The Assembly entrusted to Italy the territory of Somaliland, thereby giving her the very great and special responsibility of the future of the peoples of Somaliland, and Italy has not only accepted these great obligations under the Charter, but has demonstrated that it is able and willing to carry them out.

Therefore Italy is entitled to her seat among us on an unassailable legal basis under the Charter, on her own unique merits. She should not be placed in a wholesale heap with other applicants for membership however sound or however illusory those other members' respective claims are. Each of the other applicants is also entitled to the judgment of the organization on its qualifications. Consider for a moment the most recent member of the United Nations, Indonesia, whose application was unanimously recommended by the Security Council on September 26, 1950. The United States applied there the test it applies here and voted affirmatively there as it will in the Security Council on the Italian application. Action on the application of our most recent member shows, in the view of my delegation, the correct operation of this principle that each applicant should be considered on its merits. The Soviet representative voted in favor of that application and made no attempt to relate it to others. He addressed himself to the question then before the Security Council and said simply that he supported the application of Indonesia for membership.

The United Nations needs Italy. It needs her contribution to this organization. She is entitled to take her place among us on her own merits. The special circumstances arising out of her trusteeship make her case a special one, and therefore it is before us today.

No formula of words can hide one simple fact. Each member can raise his hand in favor of Italy's application, he can abstain, or he can raise his

hand against it. The raised hands are a fact for all to see. I want to repeat what I have said in the Fourth Committee. A hand raised against the Italian application in the General Assembly or the Security Council is a simple concrete demonstration of lack of faith in the Italian people.

My delegation is proud to continue its support for Italy's just claim for membership. Italy has earned the right for the special consideration for her application which we now ask the Security Council to afford. Therefore, the hand of the U.S. delegation is raised in support of the resolution.

Significance of Proposals For Disarmament

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

I think this session of the General Assembly—the sixth—that is now going on will be the most successful of all so far held from the point of view of strengthening the free world and its defenses. The disarmament proposals that we have put forward represent constructive and practical steps which have rallied the support of a great many of the delegates. I do not think that we can expect, from what Mr. Vyshinsky has said, that the Soviet Union is at this time prepared to accept those proposals. I stress the words “at this time.”

Some people express a cynical view—at least I think that it is cynical—that because this is so, because the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to accept sound and practical proposals, that there is something in the nature of an empty propaganda gesture in our putting a view forward. I do not hold with that kind of analysis at all. I hope the day never comes when the United States holds back fair and honest proposals, waiting for a machine to be invented that can read the minds of the Kremlin leaders and for them to say whether they will accept them or not. On that kind of approach we might as well throw the United Nations Charter out of the window as a mere propaganda document because the Soviet Union is not in compliance with it.

The delegates with whom I have talked—at least the majority of them—are very much concerned and preoccupied, as we all are, with the question of Korea. I think that the shadow which overhangs this Assembly—and I do not minimize the importance of the disarmament proposals and other statements and programs which will be made—is the shadow of the events in Korea. During the past year and a half, I think that the

attitude of the American people toward the United Nations has been pretty generally a reflection of the ups and downs of the fighting in Korea, and this is quite natural because all of us who were in the last war and all of us who have friends, relatives, and sons in this war are naturally most anxious about this subject. We all want to see an end of the fighting. Of course we do; but so far as I am aware there is no assurance that there will be an armistice even though an agreement has been reached on a demarcation line.

Two very important issues remain: the first, the question of inspection to insure against a renewed enemy build-up; and the other, the most important question of all, that is, the return of our prisoners of war. Of course, we hope that the discussions will succeed and that an armistice will result; but I think we must guard against false hopes and false fears. They are both very weakening, and we must remember that the creation of false hopes and often the creation of false fears is part of the armory of the Soviet methods and its trickery of putting the world in a sweatbox one day and an icebox the next day.

One thing which is very important, and I think perhaps all of us can agree on, is the value of the United Nations effort in Korea, and I am now talking about troops. We have made strenuous efforts ever since June 25 of last year to obtain contributions of troops from our friends in the United Nations. These efforts we all must admit—let us be frank—have not produced the desired result. We must continue in those efforts, and this Assembly is a good place in which to do so.

Finally, I have just one more point and that is, whether or not there is an armistice—and I hope there will be—Korea has brought about a degree of strength in the free world and a degree of awareness of the purposes of the Soviet Union which I do not think any of our friends in the United Nations will ever forget.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2383, October 27; S/2387, November 5; S/2393, October 18; S/2401, November 12; S/2402, November 12; S/2403, November 12; S/2404, November 12; S/2405, November 12; S/2406, November 12; S/2407, November 12; S/2409, November 13; S/2411, November 15; S/2413, November 17; S/2414, November 20; S/2420, November 24, 1951.

¹ Made over NBC television on Dec. 2 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Gross is U.S. deputy representative to the United Nations.

Trust Territories' Progress Toward Self-Government

*Statement by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

This Committee, in its debate on the report of the Trusteeship Council, in order to evaluate the report, will naturally keep constantly before it the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System as set forth in the Charter. One of the principal objectives, as set forth in article 76, is "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories . . . to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world." This Charter statement must ever be our goal.

The Trusteeship Council is thus given under the Charter a very concrete task; and we of the Fourth Committee will continually be asking ourselves, how well is the Trusteeship Council meeting its responsibilities in the discharge of that high task? Is it bringing the peoples of the trust territories appreciably nearer to the goal?

The process of self-government is one to be learned by each people for themselves by dint of their own struggle and sacrifice. Genuine freedom comes only through the fire of experience, through ripening understanding. It cannot be attained or held secure by mere political grant from one people to another nor by military victory.

The Report of the Trusteeship Council now before us summarizes the activities of the administering authorities in the building of the necessary foundations for self-government, and then sets forth the specific recommendations of the Trusteeship Council with respect to each of these fields of activity. As one of the representatives sitting in the Trusteeship Council, I think I can

truthfully say that in all of the trust territories real progress is being made. In certain cases we wish progress could be speedier. In others, progress is striking.

May I give a concrete example or two of my thought? In the building of political foundations, for instance, there is the task, first of assisting dependent peoples to develop a sense of popular responsibility for the self-government of the local unit or municipality. Within this unit the indigenous peoples often need to learn by field demonstrations and by practical experience how to put democracy into action—how to govern themselves by popular majorities. They must develop an ever increasing regard for the dignity and the sacredness of the individual personality. As these conceptions are mastered and the people learn the art of self-government in local units or municipalities, the process must be progressively broadened to include district self-government, and still later, territory-wide self-government.

I think, for instance, of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, where the inhabitants are rapidly learning the ways of democratic self-government. Here there have been organized more than 100 local municipalities since the United States assumed trusteeship responsibilities in 1947. In a continually increasing number of instances, municipal officials are elected by popular vote with a secret ballot. Approximately 30 percent of the islanders of voting age already enjoy some form of suffrage. District councils, made up of representatives from various local areas, are now being organized. For instance, in the Palau Islands, a Congress has functioned as an advisory body on island affairs since July 4, 1947. This Congress is composed of the 16 district magistrates, and Congressmen elected from each municipality on a representative basis. This Congress contains two elected Congresswomen. The first organized session of the Marshallese Congress met on July 4, 1950. The people of the Northern Marianas have indicated their desire to form a gov-

¹ Made before Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the General Assembly on Dec. 5 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Sayre is U.S. representative in the Trusteeship Council.

ernmental body for the Saipan district. The people of the separate islands, as yet, however, lack a territorial understanding or community of feeling sufficient to make possible the setting up of a territory-wide legislative or advisory council. We are pushing forward towards this objective as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Building of Economic Foundations for Individual Freedom

A study of the report before us indicates the progress similarly being made in the building of economic, of social, and of educational foundations in each of the trust territories. Without sound economic foundations there can be no genuine individual freedom. Many of the peoples in underdeveloped areas today are beset with hunger and dire poverty. In the light of twentieth century technological ability to cope with such need, the struggle for human freedom is today taking on new meaning. "For the first time in history," as President Truman declared, "humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people." To find practical means for raising the standards of living among the peoples of trust territories, ways must be found for increasing or improving local food crops and also for increasing local revenues through improved economies or perhaps through industrial development so as to make possible the purchase of food supplies or other needed materials from abroad.

Peoples of the trust territories, like many others, have been learning the superiority of the plow to the hoe, of modern scientific agriculture to archaic methods of tilling the fields.

Building economic foundations for freedom in many cases involves power development, flood control, irrigation projects. These cost money, and cannot be pushed without capital from the outside. Funds may be advanced by the administering authority; or recourse may have to be made to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For an underdeveloped people to be thrown too soon upon their own resources before they possess the ability to attract the necessary capital funds for needed economic or industrial development may delay for years their winning of economic independence and consequent genuine freedom.

Experts and technical assistance will often be needed for the building or development of industrial enterprises, in order to build up the territory's revenues. These must be secured either from the administering authority or from the United Nations Technical Assistance Board or from some other source. Technical experts may be needed for the promotion of agricultural development, or for work on livestock disease control, or for insect and pest control, for the stimulation and building up of cottage industries, or possibly for training in agricultural economics and marketing.

Systems of land tenure in many areas present seemingly unsurmountable barriers to freedom. The problem of land reform, in many parts of the world, is infinitely complex. But if real freedom is to be achieved such reform is fundamental. The General Assembly decided last year to make a frontal attack upon the problem. The Economic and Social Council is now making a profound study of this problem. The Trusteeship Council, as the current report shows, has set up a special committee to grapple with the same problem in trust territories.

In our work of supervising the administration of the trust territories, we in the Trusteeship Council are deeply concerned with this building of the necessary economic foundations. Detailed discussions are frequent, touching upon such questions as the finding of practicable methods to increase crop diversification, the creation of stabilization funds to protect against widely fluctuating world market prices (particularly in territories largely dependent upon a single crop export), the setting up of territorial marketing boards to improve and standardize the quality of the product and to insure top prices.

Difficulties abound. Economic assistance programs cannot be forced down the throats of undesiring recipients. Innovations may arouse the opposition of tribal chiefs or the holders of vested rights. Oldtime subsistence economies, easy-going and never exacting, are often of greater appeal than increased revenues. Progress is not coveted by every people, particularly if it involves the abandonment of ancestral ways of life.

The building of the necessary economic foundations clearly involves more than handing out in backward areas dollars or pounds or francs for expenditure.

Like all effective work for human progress it requires a deep understanding of the peoples concerned, tempered with infinite patience and wisdom. It will not succeed unless wrought with an abiding faith in the dignity and worth of every personality. We have still a long long way to go. Nevertheless, economic progress is being achieved—more rapidly it would seem and on a more extended scale than ever before in human history.

Strengthening of Social and Educational Foundations

Adequate social foundations are as necessary for real freedom as economic ones. The Trusteeship Council in many ways is pioneering to strengthen the social foundations of the peoples in the trust territories. One turns at random to the Council reports dealing with these issues. Here, for instance, in a recent report for Tanganyika, are listed the following problems which came under the Council's consideration: social welfare and security, population pressure and movement, standard of living, housing, child mar-

riage, immigration, general labor conditions, wage rates, trade unions, labor disputes, labor conventions and legislation, cooperative societies, medical services, hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, and prisons.

In many territories the most baffling and deep-rooted problem of all is that of interracial cooperation. Until this problem is faced and mastered, men and women can never be really free. The peoples of the United Nations at the very outset of the Charter pledge themselves to a "faith in fundamental human rights," and "in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."

It is easy to theorize—to say that every form of racial discrimination must be ruthlessly stamped out. But oversimplified conclusions do not solve the difficulties when one is wrestling with actualities.

Answers to these profound problems are being sought in many places and among many peoples. One thing we know. Experience over many years has shown that where colonial administration was based upon exploitation, it has bred only difficulties and heartbreaks and well-nigh insuperable problems. On the other hand, where administration was based upon the conception of different races sharing common problems and common fortunes, stable and reasonably satisfactory solutions have generally been reached.

Another and perhaps the most necessary foundation for progress, particularly among primitive and tribal peoples, lies in the field of education. "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "it expects what never was and never will be."

It is not always easy to fathom the thought-processes of the primitive mind. Among certain peoples in the South Pacific runs an unquestioning belief in magic, in the power of the fetish, in unholy spells. Struck with the utterly inexplicable power of foreigners to produce as from the skies inexhaustible supplies of ships and guns and food and kerosene stoves and machine monsters of indescribable power, certain of these peoples under the spell of the Cargo Cult, perhaps touched by a misunderstood conception of sacrifice, will take it upon themselves with sudden decision to destroy everything they possess—to tear down their houses, burn their belongings, chop down their trees, and root up their gardens, in a fine gesture of faith and hope that their gods will thus be induced to send to them, too, even as to the foreigners, miraculous machines and a wealth of food.

One usually finds in the trust territories an intense eagerness for modern education rather than resistance to it. Our experience has been that it is easier to get children to come to school than it is to provide sufficient schools and trained teachers for them. An educational program based upon foreign teachers for a population running into millions and even tens of millions is utterly im-

practical. Manifestly there are not enough foreign teachers to be had. Effective training schools for indigenous teachers constitute the keystone of any adequate program. Into these must be gathered the most promising boys and girls of the territory. This all takes time and costs large outlays of money.

The problem of providing teachers is only one of many. How provide native textbooks where these are nonexistent, where perhaps there is even no written language? How solve the problem of language, particularly in a territory where scores of native dialects compete and no *lingua franca* exists?

There is also the crucial question of what to teach. It will do no good to give to primitive peoples a classical education. People living in primitive or tribal conditions must learn not higher mathematics or ancient history, but how to make life more meaningful and rewarding for themselves and their fellows and how to improve the conditions under which they live.

Nevertheless, problems such as these are not insoluble. I think, for instance, of the Revised Ten Year Plan for African Education, recently issued by the Tanganyika Government and brought before the Trusteeship Council at its last session. In this latest revision the target figure of 250,000 children to be enrolled in village schools has been raised to 310,000. Some 200 "middle schools" are to be established to carry forward the school population to higher education levels. The number of primary school teachers is to be increased from 5,500 to 6,400. New teacher-training schools are to be organized so as to insure an average annual output of indigenous teachers during 1951-1956 of 750. The recurrent annual expenditures for education by 1956 as estimated in the Revised Ten Year Plan has been boosted from 557,000 to over 1,000,000.

In this carefully worked out and detailed program, there is no claim to finality. The education of the entire child population is still distant. Problems such as these cannot be solved in a night. But the great fact is that problems, even as difficult as these, are being intelligently attacked. Measurable progress is being made by the various administering authorities, with advice and assistance from various United Nations organs and specialized agencies.

The old conception of colonialism is dead or dying fast. In its place our twentieth-century world has produced a new set of conditions and resulting problems. The great challenge to our world of today is how to bring modern technological and expert and financial assistance to the aid of underdeveloped peoples in the building of the necessary foundations for human progress and freedom.

The development of modern technology and present forms of world organization have given us new instruments with which to push forward.

We can attack the problem now with chances of success which were never available to us before. If we fight with intelligence and with determination, we can win.

In the Report of the Trusteeship Council, now before us, we have the record of this endeavor as it is being carried forward in the trust territories. The position of my Government is one of full support of the work of the Trusteeship Council covering the past year. We hope that the members of this Fourth Committee will similarly give their support to the work of the Trusteeship Council in this great enterprise.

11 Countries Sponsor Collective Security Resolution

A resolution which includes various recommendations to strengthen the United Nations collective security system was submitted to Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on December 3 by Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. All are members of the Collective Measures Committee, established under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.¹

Following is the text:

U.N. doc. A/C.1/676
Dated Dec. 1, 1951

The General Assembly,

REAFFIRMING that it is one of the foremost Purposes of the United Nations to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace",

RECOGNIZING that the establishment of an effective collective security system is in harmony with other United Nations Purposes and Principles as embodied in the Charter, in particular those relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, which must be fulfilled if an enduring peace is to be secured,

REAFFIRMING its desire, as expressed in resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for Peace", to ensure that the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security pending the conclusion of agreements provided for in Article 43 of the Charter,

RECOGNIZING that the ability and readiness of States to contribute armed forces and other assistance and facilities in support of United Nations collective action are essential to an effective security system,

HAVING RECEIVED the report of the Collective Measures Committee rendered in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 377 (V),

NOTING the responses from Member States to its recommendations contained in that resolution that they maintain elements within their national armed forces which could be made available for United Nations service,

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1950, p. 655. For a statement on collective security by Harding F. Bancroft, U.S. deputy representative on the U.N. Collective Measures Committee, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 666. For an article on the Committee's report to the 6th General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 771.

CONVINCED, moreover, that additional action should be taken by States and further study undertaken by the United Nations for the establishment of an effective system of collective security under the authority of the United Nations,

RECOGNIZING that both regional and collective self-defence arrangements concluded in accordance with the terms of the Charter constitute an important aspect of the universal collective security system of the United Nations,

RECOGNIZING that United Nations collective action to be most effective should be as nearly universal as possible and that in the event of need, States not Members of the United Nations should unite their strength with that of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Collective Measures Committee and approves its conclusions;

2. *Recommends* to Member States that, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 377 (V), each take such further action as is necessary to maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

3. *Recommends* to Member States that they take such steps as are necessary to enable them in accordance with their constitutional processes to provide assistance and facilities to United Nations armed forces engaged in collective military measures undertaken by the Security Council or the General Assembly;

4. *Recommends* to Member States that they examine their legislation and administrative regulations to ensure that they can carry out promptly and effectively United Nations collective measures in accordance with their constitutional processes;

5. *Recommends* to Member States that they continue the survey of their resources provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 377 (V);

6. *Recommends* to Members of the United Nations which belong to other international bodies, or which are parties to international arrangements concluded in accordance with the Charter, that, in addition to their individual participation in the collective security system of the United Nations, they seek to obtain in and through such bodies and arrangements, within the limits of the constitutional status of those bodies and within the provisions of those arrangements, the maximum support for collective measures undertaken by the United Nations;

7. *Invites* States not Members of the United Nations to take note of the report of the Collective Measures Committee and consider ways and means in the economic as well as in other fields whereby they could contribute most effectively to collective measures undertaken by the United Nations in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint the members of the Panel of Military Experts provided for in paragraph 10 of resolution 377 (V) as soon as possible to the end that they can be made available on request to States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the training, organization and equipment of the United Nations units referred to in paragraph 2 above;

9. *Directs* the Collective Measures Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such States as the Committee finds appropriate, to continue for another year its studies on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of both regional and collective self-defence arrangements, and to report thereon to the Security Council and the General Assembly before the seventh session of the General Assembly.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT : FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2408
Transmitted November 12, 1951

I herewith submit report No. 28 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 August, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués, numbers 977-1007, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Regretfully I report that by their continuing uncooperative and uncompromising actions, the North Korean and Chinese Communist negotiators are perpetuating at Kaesong the aggression initiated against the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. There has been no progress toward attainment of agreement because the Communists have unfortunately obstructed progress. In fact, our hopes for an early truce have diminished substantially since the current Communist plans clearly do not appear to envisage it. The conference record to the Chinese and North Korean representatives is marred by a number of groundless accusations and is unfortunately devoid of any indication that the Communists intend to arrive at honorable terms of an armistice.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Nov. 12. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report in the BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; and the 27th report in the BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709.

On 16 August, the Communists accepted the United Nations Command delegation's suggestion that a subcommittee of delegates undertake to resolve the conference impasse imposed by arbitrary insistence on their one and only proposal for a line of demarcation between opposing forces, the 38th parallel. The United Nations Command representatives hoped that meetings of a few delegates from each side in an informal atmosphere and without verbatim records would encourage the Communists to refrain from their propaganda and to explore sincerely and seriously the means to obtain equitable solutions to the military problems involved in Item Two of the agenda.

Six subcommittee meetings were held between 17 and 22 August, but the meetings were similar to the preceding plenary session. Their delegates, it is evident, had been instructed to refuse to examine any proposition other than the 38th parallel for the line of demarcation. They were not permitted to consider any compromise or alternate proposal. It is possible, therefore, that the Communists intend to stalemate the conference until some critical time when they will discard the appearance of desiring peace or until they believe they can capitalize upon the fervent desire of the free world for peace to gain concessions which will place them in a favorable military position for renewed aggression. As is indicated in later portions of this report, evidence continues to accumulate that the enemy's program of rehabilitating his forces and of expanding his strong logistic base in preparation for further offensives is far advanced.

One motive of the Communists in conferring with the United Nations Command negotiators is to obtain a global audience for their propaganda. Concomitant with their tactics of forestalling progress toward a truce is their effort to discredit the United Nations Command by a variety of dubious methods.

The United Nations personnel have many times reiterated and given wide publicity to the conditions under which communist vehicles will be granted immunity from air attack; namely, that the vehicle be properly marked and that prior notification be given of its route and time of movement. Furthermore, the Communists have been informed in so many words that any vehicle which

moves without prior notification may be attacked if observed. Ignoring completely this stipulation—of not one movement since early July has prior notification been given—the Communists brazenly charge the United Nations Command with a breach of faith when their vehicles are destroyed by air attack.

In similar vein is the charge that the United Nations Command is responsible for an incident which took place in the neutral zone on 19 August. Southwest of Pan Mun Jom on this day, a Chinese lieutenant was killed. Joint investigation indicated that this was by a group of persons, many of whom were in civilian clothing. None wore a helmet, the most significant marking of the United Nations forces opposing aggression. One witness described the band as one which had for some time been in the vicinity and which has been overlooked or ignored by the Communist forces responsible for insuring the neutrality of the zone. That there is in that area considerable sentiment against the Communists is attested by the desire previously expressed by their own delegates to keep firearms on their persons for their own protection. The United Nations Command is of the opinion that the group which participated in the incident must have been partisans or irregulars of unknown loyalty. Careful investigations by all echelons of command of the units on the western front permits me to state unequivocally that no personnel under my jurisdiction were involved in the incident.

The latest of the false charges is predicated entirely upon an incident staged by the Communists themselves. Shortly before midnight on 22 August, the Communist Liaison Officer called upon the United Nations Command Officers to proceed at once to Kaesong which purportedly had just been attacked by an airplane. A joint United Nations Command-Communist investigation by the Liaison Officers until 0400 hours uncovered absolutely nothing to substantiate the allegation despite the presence of a score of Communist correspondents who were supposed to have witnessed the bombing and strafing. No property was damaged; no one was hurt; no burnt areas such as would be made by napalm could be found. There were pointed out a few craters, about twenty-four inches in diameter and, at the deepest point, about six inches in depth, a size that could have been made by a grenade preset in the ground but certainly not a bomb of any type known to the United Nations Forces. Lying on the ground or partially buried were a few pieces of metal covered with an oily substance which the Communists described as remnants of a napalm bomb. The flaws in their planted evidence became immediately apparent in that the metal pieces were flush riveted whereas the United Nations Command napalm bombs are not.

The ridiculous nature of the spurious evidence was pointed out by the United Nations Command Liaison Officers who, nevertheless, stated their de-

sire that the investigation be resumed in daylight hours. Declaring the investigation closed, the Communist Liaison Officer announced that the "evidence" would be collected for analysis. Once more, in spite of the patent falsity of the charges, the United Nations Command thoroughly reviewed the operations of its forces on that night and found that no United Nations aircraft were anywhere near the Kaesong area at the time of the purported attack nor did any of its artillery which was in range fire one round that night.

The Communists elected to suspend negotiations in conjunction with the manufacture of this "incident" and no delegates' meetings have convened since 22 August. There has been an exchange of notes between the Communist Commanders and me on this subject. In their latest, dated 28 August, they had the presumption to demand a reinvestigation of "attack" five days after their own representative had forced the closing of the initial investigation. The United Nations Command Liaison Officers on the night of the investigation had pointed out the spuriousness of the evidence. I refused to permit the United Nations Command to be placed in the position of having its own Liaison Officers become the experts whose technical knowledge would be utilized by the Communists to construct a more plausible case in support of their maliciously false claims.

On 30 August, the Communists delivered another note charging the United Nations Command with a number of technical violations of the neutral zone. These charges are under investigation at the present time and appropriate action, based upon the results of the investigation, will be taken.

It is a grievous thing that this report, which could have been a journal of progress toward peace, instead must be in great part devoted to the exposure of what can only be accepted as a deliberate falsification of the record.

Military activity was again greatest on the eastern front from Haso to Pohang. United Nations Forces there launched numerous local attacks to secure commanding heights to the immediate front, and the enemy reacted with strong and persistent counterattacks wherever he lost ground. The enemy continued to support his forward elements strongly with mortars and artillery and evinced a more aggressive tone in the volume and strength of his probing efforts on most parts of the front.

The western front was only moderately active though the enemy countered the advance of United Nations patrols and, as usual, was particularly firm in denying any entry into his positions on the fifteen-mile sector from Otan to Pangyo. Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Changdan to Chungdong, eastward to Wolsan, and northeast to Pohang.

On the eastern front contacts were virtually incessant. The heaviest fighting took place between United Nations and North Korean Forces in the

Hoegok-Pia sector and in the vicinity of Changjong. Beginning on 17 August, United Nations Forces mounted continuous local attacks to seize a series of dominating hills in the area extending from the south of Hoegok through Pia and to the south and east of Changjong. On the eastern flank of this attack, the 8th Republic of Korea Division distinguished itself by the tenacity of its attack against well organized hostile positions. The enemy struck back bitterly, strongly supporting both his holding actions and his counterattacks with artillery and mortars. The contested ground changed hands repeatedly. By 23 August, United Nations Forces in the Pia area had driven the North Korean defenders several thousand yards to the North, but persistent enemy counterattacks forced them to relinquish about half of their gains. In the area south of Hoegok, the enemy fought with determination to recover lost ground. In general, as the period closed, United Nations Forces were in possession of the principal objectives but held them under heavy enemy pressure.

However, the density of hostile formations across the front and their deployment in depth is approaching that of the massive forces which preceded former offensives. As has been previously pointed out in this report, evidence continues to accumulate that the enemy's program of rehabilitating his forces and of expanding his strong logistic base in preparation for further offensives is far advanced. Sightings indicate unusually large stocks of supplies uniformly distributed in forward areas. Vehicle sightings, in spite of limited visibility, indicate an accelerated logistic effort since 20 August and established an all time high on 26-27 August. The withdrawal of three Chinese Communist Armies from the line of contact (probably for rebuilding and re-equipping) and the appearance of elements of at least one new Chinese Communist Force Army on the western front have been reported. Recent prisoner of war reports indicate that a North Korean Corps has moved from the western to the eastern sector where North Korean Forces already hold a forty-mile front. Increased tank sighting and other evidences of a southward movement of armor suggest that hostile plans for future operations on the western front include an increased employment of armor. In every sector, hostile reactions include volumes of artillery fire, indicative of both substantial and increasing strength in that arm and of ample ammunition stocks in forward areas. For the past two months, prisoners have reported plans for an immediate "sixth phase" offensive, successively advancing the date through July and August and most recently to 1 September. The enemy is capable of launching an offensive at any time.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny to the enemy the use of Korean waters and to prevent enemy interference with the movements of United Nations shipping to and from Korea.

Carrier based and Marine shore based aircraft divided their attention between close air support of ground troops and interdiction operation against enemy supply lines and troop concentrations in rear areas. These operations were effective in spite of generally bad flying weather which was intensified by the passage of a typhoon across Korea.

United Nations surface units continued to interdict enemy movements on roads and railroads in the Wonsan, Songjin and Chonjin areas while a stepped-up program of interdiction of road and junk traffic was also carried out on the west coast of Korea in the Han Estuary and in the vicinity of Haeju.

Naval gunfire support of United Nations Ground Forces was furnished almost daily on the east coast of Korea in the Kosong area. Destroyer types provided the bulk of this support although cruisers and battleships were employed on several occasions with particularly effective results.

Minesweeping operations to expand the areas cleared of enemy mines were conducted on the western, southern, and eastern coasts of Korea. Check minesweeping of approaches to ports and of operating areas was continued. Some drifting mines were sighted and destroyed.

Continued emphasis was placed by the Far East Air Forces on interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication and supply by medium and light bombers and by fighter bombers. The medium bombers attacked marshalling yards, including one as far north as Rashin, almost daily. The Rashin mission was most successful. The superforts dropped 3417 bombs on the marshalling yards and rail rolling stock in a four-minute period. The weather was clear, and excellent results were obtained with ninety-seven percent of the bombs hitting the target. For this mission, escort was provided by the United States Navy, utilizing F9F Panther Jets. The B-29's also continued to render support to the front line troops by conducting attacks on enemy supply and troop concentrations up close to the battle line. All enemy airfields in Korea which pose an immediate threat to United Nations Forces were kept out of commission.

United States Air Force light bombers and marine fighter bombers further stepped up their constant night vigilance of well-traveled highways to disrupt and destroy vehicles resupplying and reinforcing the Communist Forces. The bad weather during a portion of the period hampered these operations; but as the weather cleared, these aircraft made up for lost time and destroyed or damaged seven hundred enemy vehicles during one night.

Fifth Air Force fighter bombers, including short-based Marines and South African Air Force F-51's, also concentrated on disrupting the flow of enemy personnel and matériel by increasing the number of sorties effecting multiple cuts of rail lines. Such tactics have seriously hindered rail traffic. In addition, aircraft loaded with bombs,

napalm, rockets and .50 caliber ammo attacked supplies, enemy command posts, vehicles, trains, and bridges as well as rendered excellent close support to United Nations ground units whenever and wherever they were called for assistance.

United States Air Force F-86's and Royal Australian Air Force Meteors patrolled "MIG alley" about twice a day when the weather permitted. However, the MIG-15's seemed reluctant to get far from their sanctuary across the Yalu River until late in the period; and then, four MIG-15's were destroyed and eight damaged with slight damage to one F-86 and loss of one Meteor.

315 Air Division (combat cargo) operations were cut back for several days due to Typhoon "MARGE." Many of the transports as well as other aircraft in the Far East had to be evacuated to airfields clear of "MARGE's" path. During this period of lessened operations backlogs were built up at most of the airlift bases which have necessitated a near doubling of sorties daily to diminish them. Air drops of vital supplies have been made to United Nations ground units isolated by the lack of adequate surface supply routes.

Cargo and medium bombardment aircraft dropped approximately thirty-nine million twenty-seven thousand leaflets over enemy rear and front areas during the period. Of these, over a million were special leaflets emphasizing that it was not the desire of the United Nations to harm innocent civilians and warning them to evacuate those areas in which military targets are located.

In conducting the civil assistance program, some of the most noteworthy achievements of the United Nations Command have been in the field of public health. In the program for prevention of epidemics and disease, an average of seventy percent of the population of South Korea have been inoculated against smallpox, typhoid, and typhus. There have been no epidemics reported to date and none are anticipated. The immunization program has involved the use of over \$1,700,000 worth of vaccines alone, not including an additional \$1,700,000 worth of other medicines actually delivered in Korea.

A program for the control of cholera by immunization of the civilian population of port cities is practically completed.

In the past, prior to modern concepts in the field of preventative medicine, there would possibly have been severe epidemics in a country ravaged by war as Korea has been. In South Korea nearly twenty percent of the total estimated present population are displaced from their homes and, as a consequence, for many, living conditions are such that proper sanitation is difficult to maintain.

Using medical supplies and equipment furnished by the United Nations Command, seventy-nine hospitals and 312 dispensaries have been established for the treatment of the civilian population and are now in operation. A total of 3,338,268 out-patients have been treated and an average load of 700,600 in-patients are being treated.

To date, nearly \$19,000,000 worth of United Nations contributions for civilian relief in Korea have been offered and, of this, nearly \$17,000,000 worth have been delivered to the Far East Command.

In order to maintain our efforts in furthering the program of civil assistance, it is vitally necessary that the supporting flow of contributions from United Nations member nations and voluntary organizations be maintained.

Documentation and investigation of reported war crimes incidents are continuing. As of 20 July 1951, approximately 8,000 United States military personnel have been reported killed as war crimes victims. Of this number, approximately 7,000 were reported killed by North Koreans and the remainder by Chinese Communists. Approximately 15,000 South Koreans, of whom 14,000 were civilians, have been reported killed in other reported incidents. This figure does not include the deaths reported in Seoul, Taejon, and other places occupied by enemy forces. Of the South Korean deaths, approximately two hundred have been reported killed by Chinese Communists and the remainder by North Koreans. As of 31 July 1951, a total of four hundred active cases were on file with the United Nations Command and 126 suspects were in custody. Documentation and investigation of some cases have progressed to the point where these cases are ready for trial in the event such is directed.

Communist tactics resulting in the frustration and later in the suspension of armistice discussions at Kaesong have been vigorously exposed in United Nations Command broadcasts and leaflets disseminated in Korea. Particular emphasis has been placed on the apparent attempt by the Communist delegation to inject political questions into the negotiations and to obtain a demarcation line based on the 38th parallel without regard for the battle situation or for military considerations. Radio broadcasts, ground and air loudspeaker broadcasts, and leaflets, including new sheets, are regularly bringing factual accounts of the Kaesong discussions to Korea civilians and to Chinese and North Korean soldiers throughout enemy territory. These media are exposing Communist efforts to conceal the truth about the negotiations and the reasons for their suspension.

TWENTY-NINTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1-15, 1951^{*}

U.N. doc. S/2410
Transmitted November 13, 1951

I herewith submit report Number 29 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 September, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués Numbers 1008-

^{*} Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Nov. 13.

1022, inclusive provide detailed accounts of these operations.

No action of the Communists during this period is indicative of a desire to reconvene sessions of the armistice talks. All Communist efforts have been devoted to the production and publication of propaganda charges attempting to discredit the United Nations Command. The current Communist tactics, which include making numerous unsupported charges, suggest their design is to produce general confusion as to the issues involved in the negotiations. These tactics cannot be expected to influence those people who enjoy a free press and free speech.

A further factor, and one to which must be attached great significance, is that they intended from the beginning to improve their military position for a possible renewal of their aggression with forces rested, reconditioned, and better equipped.

Whatever may be the present Communist strategy, their official notes and their radio are filled with baseless charges. I have replied to them several times during the period denying the charges they have made and pointing out the obvious impossibility of the charges being true. Each of my notes, and the United Nations Command delegations notes to them has emphasized the United Nations Command readiness to resume meetings when the Communist terminate the suspension they have imposed. They demanded as a condition for resuming negotiations that the United Nations Command admit to the truth of their false allegations.

On 6 September, having seen the realization of the fears we have harboured from the beginning that the Communists would misuse the privileges inherent in control of the conference site, I proposed that our liaison officers meet to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations could be continued without actual or artificial interruptions. They have so far refused to accept this suggestion.

One United Nations Command violation of the neutral zone unfortunately did take place. About 0130, 10 September, a United Nations Command B-26, off course through faulty navigation, strafed in the neutral zone but did no damage. The radar plot of the plane (made by the Fifth Air Force of the flight of all planes in the area) coupled with an interrogation of the pilot led to the conclusion that this plane did violate the neutrality of the zone. The same method has been employed to prove that other Communist charges of bombing and strafing by United Nations Command aircraft in the zone were false. United Nations Command regrets for this one incident were immediately published to the world and forwarded to the Communists, and disciplinary action has been initiated against the pilot.

The Communists, in the plethora of charges they have levelled, make much of allegations regarding overflight of Kaesong by United Nations

planes. The United Nations Command has never guaranteed that its aircraft will not fly over the zone. On 16 August when the Communist liaison officer sought to initiate an extension of the armistice agreement to include a prohibition against entry of aircraft into the air space over the neutral zone, the United Nations Command liaison officer agreed in principle subject to the understanding that there is no way we can absolutely guarantee against aircraft flying over the zone under conditions of bad weather, or for other reasons beyond our control. The Communist liaison officer specifically acknowledged this reservation. However, even this qualified draft agreement was not presented for notification to the delegates in plenary session as had been directed by them, and hence is not in actuality effective. The United Nations Air Forces have, of course, made every effort to avoid occurrences of this sort.

Enemy action on the western and west-central fronts was marked by a spurt of aggressiveness from 6 through 9 September. Hostile forces of up to regimental strength mounted a series of relatively vigorous local attacks against advanced United Nations patrol bases in the vicinities of Kangso, Amhyon, Pangyo, and Chungdong. However, having driven in the patrol bases, the enemy showed no disposition to press his attacks further. Absorbing the initial shock of these attacks, United Nations forces immediately recovered most of the lost ground, and reestablished the bases within 1000 to 3000 yards of their original positions. Most of the enemy attacks were supported by moderate volumes of artillery and mortar fire, and approximately twelve tanks supported the attack at Kangso. At the same time, small groups of tanks were sighted on various other parts of the western front. The enemy was apparently no longer content merely to intercept United Nations patrols, but initiated limited reconnaissance of United Nations positions along the main line of resistance in the same sector where he attacked the United Nations patrol bases.

On the twenty mile front from Kumhwa to Tungdae, the enemy appeared particularly insistent in denying any United Nations penetration. All patrols were intercepted close to the line of departure. Strong local United Nations attacks to the south of Chuktao and Tungdae were held to very limited gains, and the enemy made determined efforts to recover lost ground. In these actions he showed no inclination to conserve mortar ammunition, and was liberal in the use of artillery, which appears more densely concentrated in this sector than on any other part of the front. On 7 September, in the area south of Chuktao, the enemy for the first time employed Soviet type medium calibre rockets. The density of supply dumps sighted within the area immediately north of the line of contact is suggestive of a major logistic base.

United Nations local offensives continued unabated on the twenty-five mile front extending from Hoegok northeast to Komisong. Once again the most intense fighting centered around Hoegok, Pia, and Changjong. Having suffered heavy losses in the long series of United Nations assaults in these areas, hostile defensive elements were forced back three to six miles, eliminating the Wolsan pocket, and other smaller pockets in the United Nations line. The towns of Pia, Ame and Wolsan are now in United Nations hands, and our forces are in the immediate vicinity of Changjong. On 4 September, United Nations Forces penetrated to hostile artillery positions northeast of Pia, and captured three artillery pieces and other combat equipment.

Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Munsan to Kumhwa, thence eastward to Wolsan, and northeast to Pohang.

The enemy's capacity to launch a major offensive at any time suitable to his purpose has long been acknowledged. There is still no clear indication as to the exact time when such an effort might be initiated; however, indications periodically appear which testify to an advanced state of readiness to attempt passage to the offensive when he considers the time propitious. Such evidence during the period of this report included the stepped up counter reconnaissance activity against United Nations patrol bases on the western front, intensified aerial and ground reconnaissance, and the appearance of small armoured elements in action on the western front. On a few occasions the enemy has screened his activities in rear areas with smoke. As a result of continued regroupment, Chinese Communist forces are now deployed in considerable depth on nearly all parts of the western and central fronts, and the bulk of the North Korean forces are concentrated on the eastern front. There is strong evidence that major reinforcements are arriving in Korea, of which two Chinese Communist armies have already established contact with United Nations units on the front. Vehicle sightings from 1 through 7 September reached an all-time high, and the hostile logistic bases in forward areas have apparently reached levels sufficient for a sustained offensive effort. According to prisoners, additional strong reserves of artillery have moved into Korea, and are available for employment on the front. Prisoners remain unanimous in indicating that a new offensive is planned, but their information is still not conclusive as to the date. Some mention various dates in September and early October, and a few speak of general preparations for a winter offensive.

United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny Korean waters to the enemy while assuring unrestricted use of those waters to United Nations shipping.

With generally improved flying conditions prevailing, United Nations carrier-based and Marine

land-based aircraft divided their efforts between close air support of ground troops, particularly the operations on the east central front, and interdiction of enemy lines of communications in rear areas, exacting a heavy toll of enemy personnel, equipment and supplies.

Surface units continued an effective daily campaign of interdiction by Naval gunfire against enemy road and rail crossings, tunnels, bridges and troop and supply concentrations. Their main efforts were concentrated in the Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin areas although operations on a smaller scale were also conducted in the areas of the Han and Taedong River estuaries on the west coast of Korea.

United Nations surface forces were again active in providing effective naval gunfire support on the east coast of Korea.

Royal Marines from HMS *Ceylon* and seamen from the New Zealand frigate *Rotoiti* carried out two landings behind enemy lines on the west coast of Korea, inflicting casualties on the enemy and obtaining valuable information.

Check minesweeping operations continued in Korean waters, mainly in the vicinity of Wonsan. The usual numbers of drifting mines were sighted and destroyed during this period.

Increased activity by the enemy in the air and on the ground was reflected in the types of missions assigned to aircraft under control of the Far East Air Forces.

Generally, air operations have been directed toward seeking out and destroying the enemy's air force and his surface transportation means. United States Air Force F-86's and Meteors flown by Royal Australian Air Force pilots, continued to meet the increased forces of the enemy with as many as eighty MIG-15's challenging United Nations aircraft at one time. The MIG's also ventured in force as far from the Yalu as Pyongyang, engaging F-80's and F-84's attacking ground installations. The United Nations enjoyed a two-to-one record of claims over losses, a ratio not as high as reported in the past, a fact which may well be attributed to the superior numbers of enemy engaged.

Medium bombers continued their campaign against the airfields and railroad marshalling yards of the enemy, and for the first time in several months, scheduled numerous attacks on highway and rail bridges to hinder the enemy's supply build-up. Three key bridges on the main west coast rail lines were successfully attacked.

As the tempo of fighting between ground units increased, close air support by both conventional and jet fighters was stepped up with excellent results reported by the assisted ground forces. Hundreds of fighter bomber sorties were flown daily against the main supply routes in rear of the battle area. Rail cuts made by 500 pound bomb craters at critical points in the road beds are effectively hampering the enemy's resupply. The

decrease in rail movements and the increase in MIG attacks against the low-flying fighter bombers attest to the success of this phase of the interdiction programme.

An average of over 100 sorties per night have been flown by the intruder aircraft. With reconnaissance and flare-dropping planes assisting, United States Air Force B-26's and Marine shore based fighters in the first ten days destroyed or damaged over 6100 vehicles. A new high of 857 vehicles as the total for one night is claimed.

The cargo aircraft continued airlift operations, placing considerable emphasis upon paradrops of food, ammunition and medical supplies to ground units in front line areas.

Well over 100,000 troops of all nationalities have been airlifted between Korea and Japan in the rest and rehabilitation programme for the forces of the United Nations.

The dollar value of supplies and equipment actually delivered to Korea in support of the Korean economic aid programme, from 1 July 1950 to date, by United States Government agencies under the United Nations Command is \$150 million. This figure does not include the dollar value cost of following: Purchase of supplies and services in Korea; services rendered by United States service troops in rehabilitation projects such as roads, bridges, railroads, ports, signal communications, water works, ice plants, electric power systems, and power furnished from floating power barges and destroyer escorts; movements of refugees by ships, airplane, rail and truck; salaries of all persons solely engaged in Korean economic aid at all levels. The cost of the services enumerated above has not been accurately computed but is conservatively estimated to be over \$200 million. Approximately \$150 million additional is now being programmed for delivery during fiscal year 1952.

Raw materials are provided for support of the Republic of Korean Army as a military requirement; however, these supplies are considered within the sphere of the Korean economic aid programme, since the manufacture of end items in Korea affects the Korean economy by sustaining industry and providing a livelihood for a portion of the civilian population. It is conservatively estimated that approximately \$10 million worth of raw materials have been delivered to Korea for this purpose.

In addition to the phases of the Korean economic aid programme set forth above, the contributions from member nations and voluntary organizations of the United Nations have helped in no small way to alleviate the immediate conditions of suffering, disease, and starvation that were forced upon this unfortunate people by the aggression from the north. The flow of such contributions must be sustained in order to support our efforts to further the humanitarian ideals of the United Nations.

In accordance with Article 38 of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits of North Korean and Chinese Communist force prisoners of war have been actively encouraged. Instructional centres have been erected in each compound, and four hours per week of classroom instruction are provided for all prisoners upon a voluntary basis. Attendance for the weekly reporting period ending 7 September was 68.9 percent. All prisoners had the opportunity of seeing at least one motion picture programme each week. Radio broadcasts, including news, music, and prisoner of war-produced entertainment programmes were available to a majority of the prisoners. Athletics, vocational training, hobbies, and handicrafts are becoming increasingly popular. Daily and weekly news sheets are provided for the use of all literate prisoners and reading groups are encouraged for the benefit of the illiterate.

United Nations Command broadcasts and leaflets have kept Korean civilians, as well as enemy soldiers, informed of the continued postponement of armistice discussions by the Communists. These media have also exposed the successive unsubstantiated Communist allegations of United Nations violations of the Kaesong neutral zone. The effect of Communist tactics in further prolonging the period of Communist-inspired disunity of Korea has been made clear to the Korean people. Leaflets disseminated to enemy soldiers continue to reiterate the existing United Nations friendship for the Korean and Chinese people. These leaflets point out that the lives of thousands of North Koreans and Chinese Communist soldiers are being callously sacrificed by Communist leaders whose primary allegiance is not to their own nations but to alien imperialism, and whose primary objective is the enslavement of the Korean people.

Korean Armistice Negotiations

Full Military Armistice Still Goal Of U.N. Negotiators

The following statement was issued to correspondents by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, senior United Nations delegate, on November 11:

The U.N. Command's basic concept of a military armistice is of long standing and is crystal clear.

Our firm objectives of last July, when we entered into negotiations at Kaesong, continue to be our unswerving objectives today.

As military men, we are attempting to negotiate a full-fledged military armistice, based on military realities. We want an armistice agreement that will stick, and we want terms that will discourage if not prevent a resumption of hostilities. Specifically, the goals the U.N. Command delegation is striving for are:

1. The establishment of a demilitarized zone that will reflect the military situation as it exists on the day the armistice agreements are signed.

2. Completely adequate security for the U.N. Command combat forces and U.N. Command rear areas during the suspension of hostilities. This requirement calls for militarily sound defensible main positions to discourage attack and minimize the effects of any surprise attack. In addition we need adequate room for our outposts ahead of our main positions to insure early warning of attack.

3. We require concrete agreements that will prevent a buildup of military forces beyond the level existing at the time the armistice is placed in effect. This includes a provision against the rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing forces whose combat effectiveness has been significantly reduced as the result of combat.

4. We are especially concerned with quick and satisfactory arrangements relating to prisoners of war. Prompt and expeditious recovery of the thousands of U.N. Command men in enemy hands is a primary aim.

We intend to press vigorously for a full military armistice. Anything less would be totally unacceptable.

We entered into negotiations last July at Kaesong with the fervent hope that a realistic military armistice and cease-fire could be achieved quickly. Our hopes dimmed as the Communists maintained an adamant stand on the 38th as a demarcation line and basis for a demilitarized zone. When the Communists summarily suspended the meetings of the delegations on August 22, serious doubts were raised that they did not share our desire for an early armistice.

Our hopes were revived when, after 2 months of suspension, the talks were resumed on 25 October. We immediately proposed a realistic solution to an all too realistic problem. We suggested tentative establishment of a demilitarized zone related directly to the existing line of battle contact but adjustable to any subsequent military action prior to the actual signing of the armistice agreement.

But as the resumed sub-delegation talks continue, it becomes increasingly apparent that what the enemy wants in effect is a finalized zone determined now.

He wants all of the advantage of a *de facto* cease-fire so that he can prolong the armistice negotiations without cost to himself. He wants immediate relief from our inexorable military pressure—the pressure which would be an “incentive” to arrive quickly at agreement on other items.

Our proposal of yesterday on Item Two is honest and realistic and in accordance with U.N. Command's objectives. We proposed that a demarcation line and demilitarized zone be located on the actual line of ground contact at the time of the signing of the armistice. We suggested that only minor, local, and mutually desired adjustments be made to the zone or line. In effect, we said to the Communists, “The military situation existing at the time of the armistice will be the controlling factor on the location of the boundary.” We must retain this flexibility of military action, without which any immediate solution to other agenda items is problematical.

We shall continue to use every weapon in our command, be it at the conference table or on the battlefield, to achieve a complete military armistice at the earliest possible time.

But we will not compromise our principles. We will not endanger the security of our forces in the field. We will not jeopardize early recovery of our prisoners of war.

U.N. Delegates Propose Provisional Demarcation Line

On November 17 the U.N. representatives on the joint subcommittee charged with making recommendations on a demarcation line and demilitarized zone submitted a new proposal designed to break the deadlock which had developed in the discussions. Following is the text of the draft agreement:

The representatives of the U.N. Command and of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers:

- (1) *Reaffirm* their understanding that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement.

- (2) *Agree* that the present line of contact as jointly determined by the subdelegations will constitute a provisional military demarcation line, and that two lines, two kilometers from this provisional military demarcation line, will constitute the southern and northern boundaries of a provisional demilitarized zone.

- (3) *Agree* that the above provisional military demarcation line and the above provisional demilitarized zone based upon the present line of contact shall become effective in any armistice agreement signed within 30 days after this agreement is accepted by the two delegations in plenary sessions.

- (4) *Agree* that, if an armistice agreement is not signed by the end of the 30-day period, the then existing line of contact will be determined jointly by the subdelegations and will constitute a new provisional military demarcation line which will be the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone to be effective under such conditions as will be at that time mutually agreed to by the delegations of both sides.

Communists Offer Counterproposal

On November 21 the Communist delegates on the subcommittee made the following counterproposal, which resembled the U.N.'s November 17 draft in many respects:

The subdelegations of the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers and the delegation of the U.N.C reach the following agreement on the second item of the agenda, fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

(1) The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides be made the military demarcation line, and that both sides withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone.

(2) In accordance with the above-mentioned principle, the subdelegations check immediately the present line of contact, so as to fix the actual line of contact agreed upon by both sides as the military demarcation line, with the two lines two kilometers away on both sides of the military demarcation line constituting the southern and northern boundaries of the demilitarized zone.

(3) In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if agreements are reached on all the items of the agenda within 30 days and the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the above-mentioned military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone already fixed shall not be changed regardless of whatever changes that may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.

If agreements are not yet reached on all the items of the agenda by the time the 30 days transpire, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone already fixed shall be revised in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement.

U.N. Delegation Clarifies Communist Proposal

On the morning of November 22 the U.N. delegates presented to the joint subcommittee a slightly revised version of the Communist counterproposal of November 21, designed to clarify portions of the text which were ambiguous:

The subdelegations of the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers and of the U.N.C delegation reached the following agreement on the second item of the agenda, "fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea."

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.

2. In accordance with the above-stated principle, the subcommittee will determine immediately the present line of contact so as to fix it as the military demarcation line and as the median line of the demilitarized zone. If the military armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session, this agreement and the specific location of the above military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, and military demarcation line demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until

the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice is not signed by the time 30 days expire, the then existing line of contact will be determined jointly by the subcommittee and will constitute a new provisional military demarcation line which will be the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone to be effective for such purposes and for such a period as will at that time be mutually agreed by the delegations of both sides.

The Communists indicated that they accepted the first two paragraphs of the revised text. At the afternoon session on November 22, they offered their own revision of paragraph 3, handwritten in English:

(3) In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in the second article, the subdelegations shall revise, after agreements are reached on all the items of the agenda, the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement and constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice.

U.N. and Communists Agree On Provisional Arrangement

On November 23 the U.N. and Communist delegates to the joint subcommittee agreed on the text of the solution to item 2 of the agenda. The wording of paragraphs 1 and 2 follows closely the U.N. draft of November 22; paragraph 3 is substantially the text proposed November 23 by the Communists, as slightly revised by the U.N. delegation. Following is the agreed text:

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.

2. In accordance with the above-stated principle, the subdelegations will determine immediately the present line of contact so as to fix it as the military demarcation line and as the median line of the demilitarized zone. If the military armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the above military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph two above, the subdelegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, the above-mentioned demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice.

Staff Officers Agree on Location of Battle Line

While the subdelegations were discussing the terms of the agreement on the demarcation line and demilitarized zone, staff officers of the U.N. and the Communist forces discussed the actual location of the line which would become the line of demarcation. They concluded their talks on November 26, when the following statement was released to the press by the U.N. Command:

UNC and Communist staff officers this afternoon reached general agreement on the location of the actual present line of contact along the Korean battlefield. However, when the line was again checked, preparatory to having draftsmen transfer it to maps of record, points of differences developed between the UNC and Communist working versions.

These discrepancies were again discussed and final agreement was reached at 6:30 p. m. by the staff officers. The mutually agreed line was then drawn on two sets of maps and both sides initialed them indicating acceptance.

The liaison officers of both sides then agreed to recommend that the subdelegations meet at Panmunjom at 10 a. m. tomorrow to accept the staff officers proposal, and that the plenary session of the delegations meet one hour later at 11 a. m.

U.N. Proposes Principles for Carrying Out Armistice

On November 27 the joint subcommittee accepted the staff officers' decision on the location of the battle line. Later the same day the Military Armistice Conference began its first plenary session since October 25 by ratifying the joint subcommittee's recommendation as to the establishment of a line of demarcation.

The full conference then proceeded to a discussion of procedures to be followed after the signing of an armistice agreement. The U.N. delegation presented the following principles:

1. There shall be a cease-fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.
2. There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.
3. There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.
4. The Military Armistice Commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the Armistice Commission.
5. There shall be general withdrawal of forces of each side, Air, Ground, and Naval, Regular and Irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.
6. There shall be no armed forces in the Demilitarized Zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.
7. The Military Commanders shall administer their portion of the Demilitarized Zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

Fighting To Continue Until Full Armistice Is Reached

Following reports that a cease-fire had already gone into effect along part of the battle line, Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckols, official spokesman for the U.N. Command, issued the following statement on November 28:

The U.N. Command delegation's position throughout the armistice talks from July 10 to date has been unmistakably clear and is without any reservation whatsoever on the question of the continuation of hostilities until a full military armistice is reached. The position last July was

that the fighting would continue until some final agreement was reached on all agenda items. That is the U.N. Command delegation's position as of tonight. The Communists have been told repeatedly that any cease-fire will result from and follow a full military armistice agreement and this cease-fire will not precede the agreement.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. A/1823/Add.1, October 16, 1951. 29 pp. mimeo.

Election of Members of the International Court of Justice. Note by the Secretary-General. A/1879/Add.2, S/2339/Add.2, November 9, 1951. 6 pp. mimeo.

Information on the Implementation of Trusteeship Council and General Assembly Resolutions Relating to Trust Territories. Memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General. A/1903, October 9, 1951. 100 pp. mimeo. A/1903/Add.1, October 9, 1951. 170 pp. mimeo. A/1903/Add.2, October 25, 1952. 133 pp. mimeo.

Repatriation of Greek Children. Note by the Secretary-General. A/1932, November 7, 1951. 20 pp. mimeo. Report of the Secretary-General. A/1933, November 8, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo.

Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available. Report of the Secretary-General. A/1934, November 8, 1951. 21 pp. mimeo.

Adoption of the Agenda of the Sixth Regular Session and Allocation of Items to Committees, and Organization of the Session. Report of the General Committee. A/1950, November 10, 1951. 17 pp. mimeo.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund: Financial Report and Accounts for the Year Ended December 31, 1950, and Report of the Board of Auditors. A/1951, November 12, 1951. 1 p. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Refugees and Stateless Persons. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the General Assembly. E/2036, June 27, 1951. 11 pp. mimeo. E/2036/Corr.1, October 11, 1951. 1 p. mimeo. Part II. E/2036/Add.1, September 1, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/2048/Add.1, July 30, 1951. 13 pp. mimeo. Annex I, 2 pp., Annex II, 4 pp., Annex III, 2 pp., Annex IV, 3 pp., Annex V, 2 pp. Annex VI, 2 pp.

Report of the International Labor Organization. E/2050/Add.1, July 16, 1951. 33 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

New Agreement Extends Territorial Scope Of South Pacific Commission

As a result of action initiated by the U. S. Government, an international meeting of particular importance to Pacific Islands territories was held at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on November 7, 1951, at which the plenipotentiaries of the six member governments of the South Pacific Commission signed an additional agreement extending the territorial scope of the South Pacific Commission to include Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. It was most appropriate that the signing of the three official texts of the agreement (English, French, and Dutch) on behalf of each member government was done by its senior commissioner on the South Pacific Commission and that this event took place at Nouméa during the eighth session of the Commission. The agreement entered into force upon the date of signature, and the original texts are deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia along with the original agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission.¹

Raoul Angammarre, Governor of New Caledonia and dependencies, presided at an impressive and unique ceremony attended by the members of the Commission Headquarters community, the delegations to the eighth session of the Commission, and numerous local dignitaries. The signing table, in the place of the usual baize cloth, was covered with a Samoan ceremonial fine mat, a recent gift to the Commission from the people of American Samoa.

This historical fine mat (*Je Toga*) was originally presented to American Samoa by the High Commissioner, Fautuas, and members of the Fono of Fiapule of Western Samoa upon the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the raising of the American flag over the island of Tutuila as "a symbol of friendship and brotherly love" between the two territories.

¹ See BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1947, p. 459.

STATEMENT BY FELIX M. KEESING¹

When the South Seas conference convened at Canberra in 1947 for the purpose of drawing up the agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission, one of its first considerations was to reach agreement as to what territories should be included within its geographic scope. As we are all aware, it was decided at that time that those territories lying south of the Equator and extending eastward from Netherlands New Guinea to the French Establishments of Oceania should be included. Thus 14 territories spread across an ocean expanse of 10 million square miles were indicated as being within the Commission terms of reference.

It is a well-known fact that the South Seas as a geographic concept has more often than not been employed in the history and literature of the region to describe a far wider ocean area than that delimited by the agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission. Many islands lying north of the Equator were included in this concept, and mariners of the past whether they sailed to the islands of Polynesia, Melanesia, or Micronesia were all voyagers in the South Seas.

This historical concept has prevailed in more recent times and has acquired additional validity by the fact that, as the size of the world has contracted in relation to time required for communication and travel, economic, social, and educational problems have tended more and more to be regarded as parts of a common problem rather than purely local matters. It was recognized at the time of the creation of the Commission that the definition of the Equator as the northern limit of the Commission's geographic dimensions (except for the northern islands of the Gilberts) was purely arbitrary. However, the line had to be drawn somewhere. Inasmuch as agreement at

² Made upon the occasion of the signing of the agreement.

that time had not yet been reached between the Security Council of the United Nations and the United States, whereby responsibility for the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was assigned to the latter, active consideration could not then be given to including that trust territory. Neither was it very feasible to include the U. S. Territory of Guam which geographically is one of the islands of the Mariana group in the northwestern part of Micronesia and would under the circumstances have been an exceedingly isolated outpost for the Commission's work.

The United States, however, has for some time hoped that these territories would, in due course, be included within the Commission's scope because many of the economic and social problems of the two territories are common to those of the neighboring areas to the south. Moreover, the inclusion of this additional zone of islands, despite the smallness of the land area involved and the relatively slight addition to the collective population figure of the area as a whole, adds significantly to the basis of knowledge and experience upon which the United States can base its participation in the work of the Commission. By this same action the general benefits to be derived from the combined efforts of governments through the Commission will be extended to all the peoples of Micronesia.

It is fitting that this additional agreement should be signed at the Commission's Headquarters at Nouméa in the presence of a considerable number of those representatives of member governments who have been associated with the work of the Commission since its inception. I venture to hope that the modest though highly significant work which has been undertaken jointly by them will continue to progress and that the territories of the region will look increasingly to this center of international cooperation for advice and guidance in aiding the peoples in whose interest this organization has been created.

At this time it is my privilege to express to other member governments the gratification of my Government of their favorable reaction to the U. S. proposals which have culminated in the action which is being completed here. The original proposal to broaden the territorial scope of the Commission may rightly be regarded as a strong vote of confidence by the Government of the

United States in this organization. The acceptance of other member governments of this proposal can only be interpreted to mean that they share our satisfaction with the progress which has been made to date by the establishment of the Commission and the significant work upon which it has embarked.

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT

The Governments of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Desiring to extend the territorial scope of the South Pacific Commission, and

Considering that Article II of the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission opened for signature at Canberra on February 6, 1947 provides that the territorial scope of the Commission may be altered by agreement of all the participating Governments.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The territorial scope of the South Pacific Commission shall be extended to comprise, in addition to the territories described in Article II of the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission of February 6, 1947, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, as defined by Article I of the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1947.

Article II

The present agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

DONE at Nouméa this 7th day of November 1951, in the English, French, and Netherlands languages, each equally authentic, the original of which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. The Government of Australia shall transmit certified copies thereof to all other signatory Governments.

For the Government of Australia [J. R. HALLIGAN]

For the Government of the French Republic [R. L. LASSALLE-SÉRÉ]

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands [J. B. D. PENNINK]

For the Government of New Zealand [C. G. R. MCKAY]

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [A. F. R. STODDARD]

For the Government of the United States of America [FELIX M. KEESING]

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Asian Manpower Technical Conference (ILO)

The Department of State has announced that Olen Warnock, Head, Division of Technical Assistance, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor, will serve as United States delegate to the Asian Manpower Technical Conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which will convene December 12 at Bangkok, Thailand.

The general purpose of this Conference is to determine methods for fuller utilization of manpower in the development of Asian countries, and to formulate a concrete plan of action by the International Labor Organization in the manpower field in Asia.

Participants in the Conference will exchange views on the present state of manpower problems in Asian countries (including the manpower position in relation both to the present economic situation and to long-term economic development), and will discuss methods of cooperation between the ILO and Asian countries with a view to insuring the best use of the field office at Bangalore, India, and other resources. Consideration will also be given to such matters as the types of technical assistance which the ILO can provide in different fields relating to manpower problems, a review of technical-assistance projects in actual operation or under consideration, and the possibility of establishing additional ILO field missions in Asia.

Congress on Mental Health

The Department of State has announced that the United States delegation to the fourth International Congress on Mental Health which will convene on December 11 at México, D. F., Mexico, is as follows:

Chairman

Robert H. Felix, Director, National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency

Delegates

Leo H. Bartemeier, President, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C.

Muriel W. Brown, Consultant in Family Life Education, Home Economics Education Service, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency

John M. Caldwell, Col., MC, Chief Consultant in Psychiatry and Neurology to the Surgeon General, Department of the Army

Rawley E. Chambers, Col., MC, Chief of Psychiatry and Neurology of the Medical Field Service School, Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

Melvin A. Glasser, Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency

Margaret Mead, American Museum of Natural History, New York, N. Y.

Winfred Overholser, Superintendent, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Federal Security Agency

W. Carson Ryan, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

George S. Stevenson, Medical Director, National Association for Mental Health, New York, N. Y.

Robert Sutherland, Director, Hogg Foundation, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.

Harvey J. Tompkins, Chief, Psychiatry and Neurology Division, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans' Administration

This congress, which is being held under the auspices of the Government of Mexico, has been organized by the World Federation for Mental Health and the Mexican Mental Health League. Much of the work of the congress will be carried out in small discussion groups, although there will be a series of public sessions featuring lectures by top-ranking mental health personnel from many parts of the world, as well as exhibitions of a scientific and informative nature. Representatives of some 33 countries will participate in the congress.

The discussions at the forthcoming congress will be devoted primarily to consideration of the treatment and prevention of mental illness. Specific agenda items include mental health and public health; mental health and the maladjusted child; school medical services and mental health; mental health problems of transplantation and migration; legal and welfare aspects of psychiatric care; problems of neurotic attitudes in industrial workers; and community efforts in mental hygiene.

The last International Congress on Mental Health was held at London, England, August 11-21, 1948.

THE DEPARTMENT

John S. Service Dismissed

The Department of State announced on December 13 that the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission has advised the Department that this Board has found a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer.

The decision of the Loyalty Review Board is based on the evidence which was considered by the Department's Board and found to be insufficient on which to base a finding of "reasonable doubt" as to Mr. Service's loyalty or security. Copies of the opinions of both Boards are attached.¹

The Department of State's Loyalty Security Board, on July 31, 1951, had reaffirmed its earlier findings that Service was neither disloyal nor a security risk, and the case had been referred to the Loyalty Review Board for post audit on September 4, 1951. The Loyalty Review Board assumed jurisdiction of Mr. Service's case on October 9, 1951.

The chairman of the Loyalty Review Board in today's letter to the Secretary (full text attached) noted:

"The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General's list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and non-public character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, 'Standards,' of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended."

The opinion of the Loyalty Review Board stressed the points made above by the chairman—that is, it stated that the Board was not required to find and did not find Mr. Service guilty of disloyalty, but it did find that his intentional and unauthorized disclosure of confidential documents raised reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. The State Department Board, while censoring Mr. Service for indiscretions, believed that the experience Mr. Service had been through as a result of his indiscretions in 1945 had served to make him far more than normally security conscious. It found also that no reasonable doubt existed as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. On this point the State Department Board was reversed.

The chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has requested the Secretary of State to advise the Board of the effective date of the separation of Mr. Service. This request stems from the provisions of Executive Orders 9835 and 10241—which established the President's loyalty program—and the regulations promulgated thereon. These regulations are binding on the Department of State.

The Department has advised the chairman of the Loyalty Review Board that Mr. Service's employment has been terminated.

¹ For copies of the Boards' opinions see Department of State press release 1088, of Dec. 13, 1951.

Appointment of Officers

Burton Y. Berry as Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, effective December 10.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 10-14, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN.

No.	Date	Subject
1066	11/30	Walsh: Sports in new U.S.S.R. attack
1069	12/4	Convention: Safety of life at sea
1070	12/4	Mission agreement with Uruguay
1071	12/4	Recorded music from Finland
1077	12/10	Point 4 contract to Iran
1078*	12/10	Morrill: Educational exchange
1079	12/10	Berry: Acting ass't. sec., NEA
1080	12/10	Economic assistance to Israel
1081	12/11	Tax conventions with Norway
1082	12/11	Discussion on German debts
1083*	12/11	Exchange of persons
1084	12/11	4th congress on mental health
1085	12/12	Asian Manpower Technical Conf.
1086	12/12	German enemy property claims
1087	12/12	Detention of Americans in China
1088	12/13	John S. Service dismissed
1089	12/14	Acheson: Status of Schuman Plan
1090	12/14	Altarpiece returned to Italy
1091*	12/14	Sparks: Ambassador to Bolivia

Recent Releases—Continued from page 1017

Air Base at Dhahran. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2290. Pub. 4346. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia—Exchange of notes signed at Mecca and at Jidda June 18, 1951; entered into force June 18, 1951.

Fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture and Second Latin American Regional Meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Montevideo, Uruguay, December 1-12, 1950. International Organization and Conference Series II, American Republics 9. Pub. 4358. 16 pp. 15¢.

Report of the U.S. delegation.

A Junior High School Looks at UNESCO. International Organization and Conference Series IV, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 15. Pub. 4380. 26 pp. 15¢.

The story of a unit of school work on UNESCO developed at Alice Deal Junior High School, Washington, D.C.

The Philippines Today. Far Eastern Series 51. Pub. 4415. 12 pp. 10¢.

A background summary about the land and its people.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 13-19, 1951]

General Assembly

The General Committee recommendation to postpone "for the time being" consideration of the Arab State complaint against French activities in Morocco was approved by the General Assembly December 13 following a lengthy, often bitter debate. The vote was 28 (U.S., U.K., France)—23 (Soviet bloc, Arab States)—7 (China). However, Egypt announced following the vote that the six Arab States sponsoring the item ("Complaint of violation by France in Morocco of the Principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights") would make another attempt to have it included on the agenda of the sixth session.

Speaking in support of the postponement recommendation, United States Delegate Ernest Gross held that discussion of the proposed item at this time would not serve the best interests of the Moroccan people. He said:

We feel France shouldn't be hindered in the opportunity to put reforms into effect under conditions favorable to their successful execution.

Earlier, the Assembly took seven more ballots without resolving the deadlock between Greece and Byelorussia for the remaining Security Council vacancy. Action on Yugoslavia's complaint of "hostile activities" against it on the part of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites was completed December 14 with the adoption 47-5 (Soviet bloc)—2 (Iran, Afghanistan) of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee resolution calling on the governments concerned to conduct their relations in accordance with the Charter.

The new Soviet item charging the United States with "aggressive acts" on the basis of certain provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was included on the agenda by a vote 55 to 0 with Cuba and New Zealand abstaining. The United States did not object to Assembly consideration of the accusation, "because it affords us an opportunity to expose the falsity of the charges." The item was allocated to the Political Committee, where it will be taken up later in the week.

Committee I (Political and Security)—The U.S.-U.K.-French resolution establishing a new 12-member "Disarmament Commission" to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty "for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduc-

tion of all armed forces and all armaments, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only" was adopted by the Committee December 19 by a vote of 44-5 (Soviet bloc)—10 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen).

Five "principles" were set forth for the Commission's guidance, and it was specifically directed to "consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification . . . as a first and indispensable step . . ." A "conference of all states" will be convened as soon as the Commission feels any part of its work is ready for submission to governments.

All Soviet amendments to the tripartite text—which had been revised to take account of agreements reached in the Big Four subcommittee—were rejected, as was a Polish move to refer to the rival disarmament programs to an uninstructed commission.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky continued to denounce the Three Power plan and to insist on his own scheme for an immediate ban on atomic weapons, one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces, etc., but indicated that he would take part in the new Commission, which is to consist of 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada. United States Representative Philip Jessup said his Government would enter into the work of the new body "with a sincere effort to reach agreement upon those vital problems, those difficult problems which are so important for the future peace of the world."

Earlier, Dr. Jessup had expressed the hope that in the Commission it would become apparent to the Soviet Union that "there is nothing in the [Three Power] program inimical to its best interests." He added:

We propose a program in which the people of the Soviet Union will be as much a beneficiary as all other peoples. We seek no advantage save that of sharing in the general increase in security and the liberation of vast new energies and resources for world economic development.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—By a vote of 45-6 (Soviet bloc, Israel)—8 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, India, Indonesia, Sweden, Yemen, Yugoslavia), the Committee December 19 approved an amended U.S.-U.K.-French resolution appointing a commission composed of Brazil, Iceland, the

Netherlands, Pakistan, and Poland to "carry out immediately a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone of Germany to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections throughout these areas."

The Commission was given alternative instructions, depending on whether or not it succeeded in making the necessary arrangements with all parties concerned to enable it to undertake its work. The approved resolution incorporates three sets of accepted amendments designed to strengthen and clarify the original tripartite text.

The Soviet-bloc countries persisted in their opposition to the scheme, and Poland announced that it would not serve on the Commission. Nor was there any indication that East German authorities had changed their mind about "dooming" the plan. Representatives of the Federal Republic, on the other hand, received the vote "with complete satisfaction." Earlier, United States Representative John Sherman Cooper advised the Committee against assuming that the resolution would be disregarded by the Soviet-zone authorities. However, even if it was, the proposed action would still be "necessary and valuable," in the opinion of the United States.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—The Committee completed action December 18 on the question of financing economic development. The Chile-Cuba-Burma-Egypt-Yugoslavia resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to submit detailed plans for the establishment of a special fund for grants and loans to underdeveloped countries was approved 28-20 (U.S., U.K., France, China)-9 (U.S.S.R.) notwithstanding clear indications that no country which might ordinarily be expected to make significant contributions to such a fund was in a position to do so at this time.

The United States, for example, made it perfectly clear before the vote that it was not prepared "under existing world political conditions" to commit itself to contribute to a fund of this sort. Also approved, 41-0-13, was a United States-supported Greek-Brazilian text asking the Council to continue its studies, paying particular attention to the financing of non-self-liquidating projects "through existing institutions." The Cuba-Burma proposal for the submission of plans for an "international development authority" was voted down 22 (U.S.)-19-13.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—Discussion of the Human Rights Covenant has continued to center on the question whether to include economic and social rights in the same covenant with political and civil rights. As of December 18, 21 countries had spoken in favor of this course, while 16 had advocated two covenants.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—During the past week, the Committee has been discussing the Ewe and Togoland unification problem—a problem which has its origin in demands on the part of indigenous groups for the unification under one administration of the Ewe peoples—an African tribe of about one million now divided between the trust territories of French and British Togoland and an adjacent section of the Gold Coast Colony—and in concurrent demands for the unification of the two trust territories as a whole.

Spokesmen for three indigenous groups—the All-Ewe Conference, the Joint Togoland Congress, and the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*—were given an opportunity to elaborate on their respective demands. Generally speaking, they were critical of French-British arrangements for the establishments of a Joint (native) Council for Togoland Affairs to advise the administering authority "on the coordination of development plans in frontier areas, the amelioration of conditions caused by the existence of the frontier. . . ."

Before the Committee is a Franco-British resolution urging the two administering authorities and all people concerned to do their best to promote the rapid and constructive settlement of the problem "through the instrumentality" of the Joint Council.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—On December 18, the Committee adopted 36-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (Chile) the United Nations Regular Budget for 1952 at the gross figure of \$48,096,780. This compares with \$47,798,600 originally appropriated for 1951. However, supplementary estimates were approved December 17 increasing the 1951 total to \$48,925,500. Approval of the 1952 budget followed adoption of a U.S.-Canadian proposal to include, subject to certain restrictions, the lump sum of \$5,500,000 to cover items (investigations, inquiries, construction) not yet reviewed and approved in detail. It was agreed that "on a provisional basis" the balance on the surplus account (\$239,000) available for application against assessments for 1952 should be transferred to the Working Capital Fund, and not used as hitherto to reduce annual assessments.

Committee VI (Legal)—The question of reservations to multilateral conventions has occupied the Committee for the past 2 weeks. Debate has centered on the question whether or not the objection of a single state to a reservation to a treaty by another state should be sufficient to prevent the reserving state from becoming a party to that treaty. The United States view, as stated by John Maktos, U. S. representative on the Committee, is that "we do not advance the progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties by insistence on unanimous consent to reservations." Several proposals have been introduced, including a United States text based on the International Court of Justice opinion regarding reservations to the genocide convention.

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